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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE GROWTH IN the economy and the increase in passen-
ger and cargo activity have forced airports to expand to pre-
vent congestion and serve the needs of airlines flying through
these airports. Expansions frequently result in increased noise
and pollution, reducing the value of property surrounding air-
ports. At the same time, airport expansions have provided eco-
nomic benefits to the regions in which these airports operate
and to the nation as a whole. In an effort to address these is-
sues, parties at the federal, state, and local level have developed
mitigation programs to compensate property owners for noise
impacts, zoning ordinances to regulate land use, legislation to
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coordinate airport development, and limited judicial recogni-
tion of damages resulting from noise impacts.
The United States Department of Transportation (USDOT)
and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) primarily gov-
ern the airspace of the national air transportation system.' De-
spite the broad federal preemption of airspace, each airport
remains largely subject to independent, local government con-
trol with respect to land use planning, noise and environmental
pollution control, and zoning.2 This patchwork of local, state
and federal control has created significant litigation as airports
have expanded to meet the increasing demands for air service.
Attendant problems of increased noise and pollution have re-
sulted in significant problems for landowners around airports.
In many cases, landlocked airports lack the capacity to expand
without significantly affecting the property rights of surround-
ing landowners.
Property owners complain that their property values signifi-
cantly decline as a result of increased noise. In addition to this
localized economic impact, owners also complain that increased
noise adversely impacts their enjoyment of the property. Propo-
nents of more restrictive noise control standards argue that air-
ports are "bad neighbors" that do not work with the
surrounding communities to develop solutions that can effec-
tively protect the economic interests of landowners.' Noise con-
trol opponents argue that the need for increased air capacity to
meet current and future transportation requirements outweighs
the risk of localized economic loss. Opponents also claimed
that, in many instances, property owners voluntarily buy prop-
erty around airports despite notice that airport operations
might change in the future.
In many instances, airports devise Airport Development Plans
(ADP) in order to provide adequate notice to communities of
planned airport expansions. Courts have invalidated noise con-
trol zoning ordinances that conflict with these comprehensive
1 See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (1999) (stating "The United States Government has
exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.").
2 See Lyn Loyd Creswell, Airport Policy in the United States: The Need for Accounta-
bility, Planning and Leadership, 19 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 6 (1990).
3 One organization based in Vermont demonstrates the degree of popular re-
action against airport expansions. The Noise Pollution Clearinghouse operates
as a national non-profit organization that distributes noise-related information to
concerned citizens. See The Noise Pollution Clearinghouse (visited Dec. 10, 1999)
<http://www.nonoise.org/>.
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development plans.4 Despite some airports' best efforts, devel-
opers and landowners develop and buy property regardless of
airport planning. Developers or landowners may also acquire
property with no expectation that airport noise might become a
future problem, particularly when local zoning permits such de-
velopment. To the extent that airports provide sufficient notice,
landowners may not be able to collect damages from noise im-
pacts. Individuals may, however, recover damages for noise at-
tributable to airport operations if they show that after acquiring
a property interest, there was a "significant" change in the type
or frequency of operations, the airport layout, flight patterns,
nighttime operations, or the extent of noise damages.5
When airports become landlocked and unable to develop ad-
ditional capacity without acquiring surrounding property, land-
owners may have no choice but to sell their property to airport
authorities in return for compensation, or accept an easement
or other encumbrance permitting airports to operate near their
property. Alternatives such as land banking 6 have not proven
economically feasible in light of the desire to maximize wealth-
producing value of land. Landlocked airports can therefore ei-
ther exercise eminent domain and compensate property owners
accordingly, or build new facilities. Although an airport may
have the present ability to expand, continuous airport expan-
sion inevitably reaches the limit of available land, causing
problems between property owners and airport management.
Regardless of these problems, developers continue to build
around airports to take advantage of obvious benefits, including
ease of transportation.
This comment analyzes the legal issues surrounding airport
expansion. Part II traces the development and economics of the
"hub and spoke system." The section argues that overburdened
primary hubs constrain airports' ability to expand.. Part III ex-
amines the federal statutory framework as it relates to the opera-
tion of airports, land use planning, and noise impacts. The
4 See Steven H. Magee, Comment, Protecting Land Around Airports: Avoiding Reg-
ulatory Taking Claims by Comprehensive Planning and Zoning, 62 J. AiR L. & COM.
243, 266 (1996) (citing Pennington County v. Moore, 525 N.W.2d 257 (S.D.
1994)).
5 See 49 U.S.C. § 47506(a) (1), (2) (1999); see also infra note 193 and accompa-
nying text.
6 Generally, land banking involves the acquisition of property by airport opera-
tors or government agencies for the purposes of future development. See infra
note 115 and accompanying text.
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section summarizes attempts by Congress to develop a coordi-
nated national transportation policy that balances the goals of
safety, economic development, and preservation of property
rights. Part IV analyzes the federal preemption doctrine, under
which courts have attempted to determine whether state and lo-
cal governments can adopt noise control ordinances not ex-
pressly prohibited by federal statute. Part V analyzes the impacts
of local zoning and land use planning on airports. In regulatory
areas not preempted by federal law, zoning allows local govern-
ments to minimize noise impacts by planning land uses consis-
tent with airport activity. Part VI analyzes the requirement of
environmental impact statements in the process of airport devel-
opment. Environmental Impacts Statements (EIS) must be in-
cluded in any planned expansion, and require airport
authorities to carefully weigh less environmentally harmful alter-
natives. Courts have routinely declined to interpret these re-
quirements strictly, and frequently defer to agencies' decisions.
Part VII examines the use of "takings" claims as a way to enjoin
airports from creating excessive noise, or to collect damages
from harm resulting from unconstitutional "takings" by govern-
ment agencies. Part VIII analyzes common law public nuisance
or trespass theories. When takings claims fail, landowners claim
damages under these common law theories. Courts typically dis-
favor such claims where airports provide actual or constructive
notice of operations, the potential harm would be apparent to
the landowner, or the noise does not exceed expected and
proper levels. Finally, Part IX offers a series of alternative pro-
posals that might better balance the needs of landowners with
the needs of the air transportation system. The section recom-
mends developing under-utilized airports and re-routing traffic
to alleviate over-capacity.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "HUB AND SPOKE" SYSTEM
From the 1930s to the 1960s, the air transportation system pri-
marily operated as a "point to point" network in which passen-
gers embarked at an origin airport and disembarked at a
destination airport without connecting through a central point.
During the 1970s, air carriers began to concentrate their opera-
tions in a "hub and spoke" system. In this system, passengers
were routed through connecting hubs to their final destination.
The hub and spoke system allowed the airlines to concentrate
traffic through a small number of central points. A greater
number of flights could also be scheduled at particular points in
448
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time. The hub and spoke system, however, required that hub
airports have the necessary capacity to handle the increased
number of flights.7 The development of this system accelerated
after airline deregulation in 1978.8
Deregulation's objective was to provide a competitive environ-
ment for airlines, in which market forces would improve service
and decrease ticket prices.' Prior to airline deregulation, the
federal government controlled pricing and routing through the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), discouraging airlines from de-
veloping economic efficiencies and market share through novel
pricing and routing techniques. Deregulation created a new,
competitive marketplace that forced airlines to develop ways to
cut the unit costs of transporting passengers. The hub and
spoke system was ideal for the dual goals of building traffic while
decreasing unit costs. Through hubbing, airlines could take ad-
vantage of network and scale economies by routing all traffic
through hubs, while offering more frequent service to "spokes"
or destination markets. The concentration of operations also al-
lowed airlines to build de facto regional service monopolies
through their hubs, freezing out competition seeking to fly out
of the same airports.'0
The primary economic justification for hubbing is increasing
load factors and yields in planes traveling through central hubs.
"Load factor" is the proportion of revenue passenger miles to
available seat miles, essentially, the percentage of seats in a
plane actually sold and occupied by passengers. 'Yield" is the
revenue per unit of traffic carried, either revenue per passenger
per mile or revenue per ton of cargo per mile. The distance
traveled in mileage is essential in the calculation because of the
costs of delivery over distance, including fuel and time."I Hub-
bing efficiencies are realized when staffing costs, terminal fees,
facility charges, maintenance overhead, lease of airport prop-
7 For in depth analysis of the hub and spoke system, see PAUL STEPHEN DEMP-
SEY & LAURENCE E. GESELL, AIR TRANSPORTATION: FOUNDATIONS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 452 (1997).
8 See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)
(codified at 49 app. U.S.C. § 1305(b)(1) (1988)).
s, See DEMPSEY & GESELL, supYra note 7, at 452. The concentration of flights in
hubs has drawn significant criticism from opponents of the hub and spoke con-
cept, who argue that large airlines dominate traffic in key airports at the expense
of "monopoly pricing at Fortress Hubs." Id.
10 See id. at 451-61. Modern examples include Delta Airlines in Atlanta, United
Airlines in Chicago, and American Airlines in Dallas/Fort Worth.
I See id. at 457.
2000] 449
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
erty, and other costs are reduced as the yield and load factors
increase.
Predictably, hubbing can also produce lower quality of service
and increased delays. Airlines operating in the hub and spoke
system have overloaded the ability of major airports to handle
increased traffic. The "variability factor" in passenger travel con-
tributes to a large extent to the difficulty in providing adequate
capacity. 12 Passenger traffic experiences variations seasonally,
by day of the week, and by hour of the day. Airline passenger
load factors will correspondingly vary depending on whether
travel is scheduled on peak days or peak times during the day, or
"trough" periods in which the number of passengers on the
plane decreases." In order to produce the highest possible load
factors, airlines will typically schedule flights over small windows
in time in order to increase load factors. Hubs allow airlines to
perform this "compressed" scheduling more effectively than if
airlines operated. in point to point systems, in which airlines
would be more susceptible to variations in demand. Increased
scheduling, in turn, strains airport capacity because an airport
can handle only so many landings and takeoffs during peak
hours within safety limits. Noise problems exacerbated as the
number of flights approaches capacity are further magnified
when airports expand by adding new runways.
Another factor affecting capacity is the "S-curve" phenome-
non.'4 The phenomenon results from the relationship of fre-
quency of service to market share. An airline's market share
increases as frequency of service increases, and decreases as fre-
quency is reduced. As a result, airlines will compete for market
share by providing excess capacity.'" The S-curve suggests that
passengers prefer airlines with more frequent service because
12 For a discussion of the characteristics of demand for air service and the pro-
cess of calculating air rates, see WILLIAM E. O'CONNOR, AN INTRODUCTION TO
AIRLINE ECONOMICS 78-120 (3d ed. 1985).
13 Airlines schedule flights over peak times in order to take advantage of the
"rush" of passengers, who typically travel over small windows of time, at 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m. If airlines were to schedule flights during "trough" periods, changes
in scheduling may produce changes in passenger behavior. Thus, airlines use off-
peak pricing and discounts in order to encourage flight during trough periods.
Increased revenues may, however, be a function of the demand elasticity result-
ing from price changes,.rather than changed passenger behavior. See id. at 81-82.
i4 See id. at 88-91. The "S-curve" refers to the mathematical relationship be-
tween increases in the frequency of service and increases in passenger demand,
graphically represented in a flattened S shape. See id. at 89.
15 See DEMPSEY & GESELL, supra note 7, at 440.
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they can find more desirable departure times and available
space on the carrier with greater capacity. 16 Deregulation oppo-
nents argue that the theory demonstrates the problems with the
free market, and advocate controlling excess capacity through
better control of scheduling. Deregulation proponents have ar-
gued that competitive forces in fact discourage excess capacity
because an airline will simply transfer operations to more profit-
able markets if demand is too slack, rather than increase capac-
ity along the imaginary S-curve. They also deride the S-curve
theory as counter-intuitive to market experience, because an air-
line will not add capacity simply to add market share if not
enough passengers are available or interested in that carrier's
service."
The key feature of the "S-curve" phenomenon is that it tends
to result in excess capacity, which in turn results in more flights
being scheduled during peak times than airports can safely han-
dle. One commentator has stated that "[t]he provision of too
many air transport seats brings ruin to the air transportation
marketplace commons' when capacity exceeds demand. Airline
seats are a perishable commodity, and unfilled seats have a cost
which cannot be recovered."' 8 An equally detrimental "tragedy
of the commons"19 stems from the insistence that airports and
the air traffic control (ATC) system provide the infrastructure to
meet the increasing demand stemming from carriers' desire for
additional market share. Like airplane seats, airport "slots" for
landing or departure are perishable commodities, and the abil-
ity of airports to provide additional space is significantly
constrained.
Overburdened primary hubs coexist with regional airports
that are significantly underserved because the smaller regional
airports did not fully integrate into the national hub and spoke
system. As a result, major cities in the United States have both
huge, overburdened "international" airports, and empty, under-
served "regional" airports. 20 Hubbing has also changed the rela-
16 See O'CONNOR, supra note 12, at 88.
17 See id.
18 DEMPSEY & GESELL, supra note 7, at 441.
19 The concept refers to the economic theory that rational wealth-maximizers
will exploit a common resource to point of depletion (the "tragedy") because the
positive utility to a single user of taking one unit of the resource outweighs the
cost of exhausting the resource with this cost is spread out over all common users
of the resource.
20 See DEMPSEY & GESELL, supra note 7, at 452.
20001
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
tionship among major carriers and the hub airports through
which they fly. Traditional leases designed to encourage and
retain carriers for long periods of time have evolved to restrict
new entrants from competing through the major hubs.21 Thus,
major hub airports have a limited number of available gates and
available runways primarily controlled by incumbent tenants.
Increased hub service strains the ATC system's ability to
schedule a larger number of flights through smaller slivers of
airspace over smaller periods of time. As airlines increase load
factors and frequency, passengers face longer delays because of
the difficulty of managing airspace. Many CEOs of U.S. airlines
blame the FAA for the ATC's problems, arguing that "the gov-
ernment's management of the ATC system [is] .. .an artificial
barrier to free competition, and totally incongruous with the
tenets of airline deregulatory policy. '2 2 Former American Air-
lines Chairman Robert Crandall opined that the FAA and the
ATC system possess the ability to process a greater number of
flights through airspace, but choose not to because of bureau-
cracy and inefficiency. 23 Jonathan Howe, the Director General
of Airports Council International (ACI), stated in a March 12,
1998 media release that "airport operators must be ready and
able to accommodate increased air traffic as better airspace
management brings more aircraft to terminal areas." ACI also
supports the goal of improving the ATC in order to increase
capacity at noise-constrained airports.24 Problems with the un-
derlying infrastructure prompted Congress to consider initia-
tives to privatize the FAA in order to make it more responsive to
the needs of airports, air carriers, and the marketplace.
Some commentators also argue that the evolution of major
airport hubs has created an "entrenchment" mentality among
these airports, removing any incentives to design an alternate
integrated national system that would more efficiently route traf-
fic. Given the huge economic benefits of hub airports to com-
munities, and the amount of revenue generated for the airport
proprietors, the predictable result is a lack of political will to
propose solutions other than expansion.2 5 But the hub and
21 See id.
22 Id. at 458.
23 See Speaker's Forum: Robert Crandall (NPR radio broadcast, December 12,
1999) (on file with the author).
24 See Airports Council International, ACI Media Releases (visited December
16, 1999) <http://www.airports.org/media/index.html>.
2 See DEMPSEY & GESELL, supfra note 7, at 453.
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spoke system has driven the economic growth of the nation by
dramatically decreasing ticket costs and increasing service fre-
quency. It is difficult to imagine that the air transportation sys-
tem would have developed as quickly or effectively in a point to
point system without the economies of scale produced by hub-
bing, notwithstanding the success of point to point carriers like
Southwest Airlines, based out of Dallas Love Field. Airlines'
principal goals in today's system are to increase capacity, both in
the ATC and on the ground, and to schedule more frequent
flights. Higher frequency of flights increases yield and load fac-
tors, while decreasing unit operating costs and landing fees per
plane. These legitimate goals of the airlines clash directly with
the problem of capacity constraints in already overburdened air-
ports and the ATC.
A more economically sensible method of handling airport
traffic should include routing flights through underutilized air-
ports in the national air transportation system. "More efficient
use of airport resources might be achieved if the large peaks and
valleys of aircraft takeoffs and landings could be spread more
evenly throughout the day, particularly at congested hub air-
ports.' 26 On the other hand, using underutilized airports as
safety valves might result in a separate set of problems. Commu-
nity resistance to loss of revenue, costs of upgrading underutil-
ized airports to handle excess capacity, economic impacts on air
carriers and other associated expenses would sap the political
will to alter the way the national system currently operates.27 Ex-
panding existing hub airports may only provide an illusory solu-
tion to capacity problems, because a limited number of flights
can be scheduled at a particular point in time. Expansion may
produce some positive short-term benefits of decreased conges-
tion, but the upper limit on capacity would be reached by the
very nature of the hub concept.
III. FEDERAL STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
Since the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, the
federal government has worked to define a coherent national
air policy that places the responsibility for regulating the air
transportation system in the hands of federal agencies, while at
the same time attempting to retain traditional local control over
land use and zoning. The tension between federal statutes and
2( Id. at 291.
27 See id.
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local regulations has restricted the ability to craft balanced solu-
tions to the problem of increased noise. The FAA, pursuant to
federal law, does not allow airports to develop noise mitigation
programs at the expense of interstate commerce. Municipalities
are also restricted by statutory language that tends to favor fed-
eral preemption over state or local laws that have a potentially
negative impact on the air transportation system as a whole.
Congress first passed laws regulating air transportation with
the Air Mail Act of 1925, which governed the transportation of
mail by air. Congress subsequently passed the Air Commerce
Act of 1926, which provided revenue to support airline opera-
tions, created an airspace infrastructure, and promoted the in-
dustry.28 In 1938 Congress attempted for the first time to
develop a national commercial air policy that addressed the
needs of passenger and cargo air carriers. The McCarren-Lea
Act, also known as the Civil Aeronautics Act, established the
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), the agency with primary respon-
sibility for regulating the air industry.2 " The Act set forth the
general policy of the United States: the encouragement and de-
velopment of the air transportation system, the regulation of air
transportation to assure a high degree of safety and sound eco-
nomic conditions, and the promotion of efficient service by air
carriers without unfair competitive practices or unjust discrimi-
nation °.3  The Act also gave the CAB sweeping regulatory au-
thority to set fares, approve or disapprove mergers, decide what
routes airlines should fly, negotiate routes with foreign govern-
ments, and issue waivers of regulations to air carriers.31
The Civil Aeronautics Act was superceded in 1958 by the Fed-
eral Aviation Act, which established the FAA. The Federal Avia-
tion Act retained the policy language of the Civil Aeronautics
Act and maintained the CAB as the primary regulatory agency
with respect to decisions on airfares and routes. 2 Prior to 1978,
28 See id. at 201-207.
29 See PAUL BIEDERMAN, THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY, xi (1982); 49 U.S.C. §§ 401-
722, repealed by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731
(current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1999)).
30 See BIEDERMAN, supra note 29.
31 See id. at xii.
32 See id.; Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (cur-
rent version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1999)). In 1984 Congress enacted the
Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 99 Stat 1703
(1984), formally transferring the functions of the CAB to the Secretary of Trans-
portation, thus removing the last vestiges of the Federal regulatory scheme of the
early 1900s.
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federal agencies had broad preemptive authority, and states and
municipalities could not easily enact regulations and ordinances
that affected airports. Congress did not significantly alter these
statutory responsibilities until the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, although Congress did enact the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA")3" in 1969 to regulate environmental issues
related to airport development and operations.
The NEPA plays a significant role in regulating airport noise
and other environmental impacts. This statute requires federal
agencies to produce detailed statements describing the poten-
tial environmental impact of a proposed action. Such environ-
mental impact statements (EIS) must include: any adverse
environmental effects that cannot be avoided should the propo-
sal be implemented; alternatives to the proposed action; a com-
parison of local environmental impacts with long-term
productivity enhancement; and any irreversible or irretrievable
commitments of resources should the proposed action be imple-
mented. 4 The Act requires that any proposed federal action
with significant impact on the quality of the human environ-
ment should include an EIS. 5
The statute does not clearly apply to local or state govern-
ments that promulgate regulations within the scope of local au-
thority. This section does, however, apply to "any major Federal
action funded under a program of grants to States." 6 It further
provides that an EIS is not "legally insufficient" solely by reason
of having been prepared by a state agency if the state agency
had statewide jurisdiction and responsibility for the proposed
action, the "responsible" federal official offered guidance, and
the responsible federal official independently evaluated the
EIS.37 Arguably, Passenger Facility Charges collected in the Avi-
ation Trust Fund, and the provision of federal grants for airport
development pursuant to the Airport and Airway Improvement
Act,3" would implicate § 4332 (D) of Title 42 and require federal
agencies to review any EIS produced by a state agency. The un-
certainty of this law is magnified by the fact that the federal gov-
ernment controls the airspace above the airport, while the local
33 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d
(1999).
34 See id. § 4332(2) (C).
'15 See id.
36 Id.
37 See id. § 4332(2)(D).
38 See infra note 41 and accompanying text.
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or state government controls the ground space and airport
property. Any alteration of airport property, with attendant ef-
fects on pollution, would presumably impact the federal govern-
ment's ability to manage airspace with the goal of improving the
efficiency of the air traffic system. However, the state action
would not appear to automatically trigger the publication of an
environmental impact statement by the responsible federal
agency, unless the airport receives federal funds. 9
After the passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,4o
Congress attempted to enact a systematic national air aviation
policy designed to address capacity and noise impact problems
in the air transportation system.4 The Airport and Airway Im-
provement Act of 1982 described the highest aviation priority of
the United States as the "safe operation" of the airport and air-
way system.42 In the context of safety as the primary concern of
air transportation, Congress provided that aviation facilities
should be constructed and operated to "minimize current and
projected noise impact on nearby communities" with "special
emphasis on developing 'reliever' airports. '43 To accomplish
the development of additional capacity, Congress recom-
mended the conversion of appropriate former military air bases
39 See DEMPSEY & GESELL, supra note 7, at 291. Congress also addressed noise
pollution in the Noise Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-574, 86 Stat. 1234
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901-4918 (1999)). The Act amending the Federal Avia-
tion Act of 1958 expressed Congressional policy to noise pollution, and is mainly
codified in Title 42 (The Public Health and Welfare) rather than Title 49 (Trans-
portation). The Act established the Quiet Communities Program, mandating
grants to state and local agencies for noise abatement under the administration
of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). See 42 U.S.C. § 4913(c) (1999).
Section 4913 expressly provides for the development of noise control technology
and cooperation between FAA and EPA in regulations to control and abate air-
craft noise under 49 U.S.C. § 44715 (1999) (originally codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 1431 (1999)).
40 See supra Part II for a discussion of the impacts of deregulation on the devel-
opment of the hub and spoke system.
41 See Airport and Airway Improvement Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 47101-47533 (1999)
(original version at Pub. L. No. 97-248, Title V, 96 Stat. 671).
42 Id. § 47 101(a)(1).
43 Id. § 47101 (a) (2), (3). The statute also places a high priority on reducing
"noncompatible" land uses around airports that would lead to noise problems.
See id. § 47101(c). Although the statute does not define what constitutes "non-
compatible" land uses, possible categories might include airport activities that
affect residential or business developments unrelated to air transportation. In
contrast, road development or the construction of a passenger rail station near
airport property would probably be a compatible land use. The determination of
"noncompatible" land uses will likely devolve to local zoning authorities. See infra
Part V.
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to civilian use.44 Congress also emphasized the need to develop
and enhance cargo hub airports, possibly signaling Congress'
recognition that routing both passenger and "pure" cargo traffic
through the same congested hubs is not an effective distribution
of traffic.4 5 The statute further recommended airport construc-
tion and improvement projects to increase capacity of current
hubbing facilities, while ensuring safety and efficiency.46 Con-
gress warned against the use of "artificial restrictions" on airport
capacity unless less restrictive alternatives have been considered
and such restrictions do not discriminate unjustly between types
of aircraft.47 The statute does not explain what would constitute
an "artificial restriction," although any attempt by state or local
governments to limit the ability of airports to expand might
qualify as artificial restrictions that are not in the public interest
according to § 47101.
The statute, more importantly, provides for coordination of
airport development and planning among the local, state, and
federal governments. It specifically states that the Secretary of
Transportation "shall ... [c]ooperate with State and local offi-
cials in developing airport plans and programs that are based on
overall transportation needs. The airport plans and programs
shall be developed in coordination with other transportation
planning and considering comprehensive long-range land-use
plans and overall social, economic, environmental, system per-
formance, and energy conservation objectives."48 The statute
encourages airport sponsors and public officials to develop
master plans that effectively coordinate airport and local plan-
ning, provide for multimodal planning,49 and integrate metro-
politan land use into a master plan. ° Section 47106 of Title 49
provides for grants by the Federal government for the purposes
of airport development, consistent with the statutory goals of
compatible land use. The Secretary of Transportation may ap-
prove an application for an airport development grant if the air-
port sponsor or public agency has good title to land to be used
44 See id. § 47101(a) (10).
45 See id. § 47101(a) (4).
46 See id. § 47101 (a) (7).
47 See 49 U.S.C. § 47101(a) (9) (1999).
48 Id. § 47101(g)(1).
49 Generally, multimodal planning addresses the combinations of land, rail,
water, and air transportation infrastructure to improve the efficient distribution
of resources.
50 See 49 U.S.C. § 4 7 10 1 (g)( 2 ) (1999).
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for development, the interests of the community near the pro-
posed project have been given fair consideration, and an oppor-
tunity for a public hearing was given to consider the
environmental effects of the development.5"
The Airport and Airway Safety and Capacity Expansion Act of
19875 and the Airport and Airway Safety, Capacity, Noise Im-
provement, and Intermodal Transportation Act of 1992"
amended the Airport and Airway Improvement Act to address
noise impacts affecting communities surrounding airports. Cur-
rently, Section 47502 of Title 49 requires the Secretary of Trans-
portation to develop a regulatory system for measuring noise
impacts identifying land uses compatible to various noise expo-
sures. An airport proprietor may submit noise exposure maps
prepared in consultation with public agencies and planning au-
thorities showing the levels of noise and noncompatible uses in
each area.14 Additionally, airport proprietors may submit noise
compatibility programs for approval by the Secretary of Trans-
portation after discussion with planning authorities and notice
and opportunity for public hearing.55 Noise compatibility pro-
grams "shall state the measures the operator has taken or pro-
poses to take to reduce existing noncompatible uses and
prevent introducing additional noncompatible uses in the area
covered by the map." In order to reduce noncompatible land
use, an airport operator may design a program that:
" establishes preferential runway systems;
" restricts aircraft with certain noise characteristics from using
the airport;
" constructs barriers and acoustical shielding for public
buildings;
* uses flight procedures to limit noise exposure;
" acquires easements, land rights, and development rights to
property to be developed in ways compatible with airport
operations. 5
6
51 See id. § 47106(b)-(c).
52 Pub. L. No. 100-223, 101 Stat. 1486 (current version in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.).
3 Pub. L. No. 102-581, 106 Stat. 4872 (current version in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.).
,14 See 49 U.S.C. § 47503 (1999).
5 See id. § 47504(a)(1).
56 Id. § 47 504(a) (2).
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By approving a noise compatibility program, the Secretary
may incur obligations under Section 48103"7 to provide grants
for soundproofing residential buildings as part of a noise mitiga-
tion program.58 Despite the ability of airport operators and
planning agencies to provide ways of mitigating noise impacts,
the statute does not confer automatic approval by the DOT.
The Secretary "shall approve the program ... if the program-
(A) does not place an unreasonable burden on interstate or for-
"159eign commerce ....
Congress passed the Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 19906(
to develop a national aviation noise policy. Congress found that
"community noise concerns have led to uncoordinated and in-
consistent restrictions on aviation that could impede the na-
tional air transportation system."'" Congress further stated that
community concerns about noise pollution "can be alleviated
through the use of new aircraft technology and the use of reve-
nues, including those available from passenger facility fees, for
noise management. '6 2 Under the statute, the Secretary of
Transportation must establish regulations mandating the
phaseout of Stage 2 aircraft, and phase-in of Stage 3 aircraft that
generate significantly lower noise levels." These regulations
must take into account an economic analysis of the impacts of
Stage 2 phaseout, including: (1) the ability of air carriers to
achieve capacity growth; (2) the impact of competition in the
airline industry; (3) the impacts of the phaseout on small com-
munity airports; and (4) the impacts of "new entries" in the in-
57 Section 48103 of Title 49 provides money in the Airport and Airway Trust
Fund established under section 9502 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Title
26) to make grants for airport planning and airport development, airport noise
compatibility planning, and carrying out noise compatibility noise programs. See
49 U.S.C. § 48103 (1999).
58 See id. § 47504(c).
51 Id. § 47504(b)(1)(A). The statute appears to be consistent with the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S.
624 (1973), that federal law preempts a local ordinance when the ordinance af-
fects interstate commerce. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
60 Pub. L. No. 101-508, Title IX, Subtitle D, 104 Stat. 1388-378 (current version
at 49 U.S.C. §§ 47521-47529 (1999)).
6' 49 U.S.C. § 47521(2) (1999).
62 Id. § 47521(5). Congress' position on the availability of passenger facility
fee revenues is curious in light of other statutes currently in force which prevent
states from taxing passenger facility fees for the purposes of noise mitigation un-
less the airport is an eligible public agency that actually controls a commercial
service airport. See 49 U.S.C. § 40117(a) (2), (b)(2) (1999).
61 See id. § 47523(a) (1999).
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dustry.6 4 Presumably, if the impacts of Stage 2 phaseout have an
unreasonably adverse impact on competition or capacity in the
air transportation system, the Secretary can modify the regula-
tions to waive the phaseout of Stage 2 aircraft, or extend the
period of time for compliance with regulations. Pursuant to the
statute, the FAA enacted regulations calling for the phaseout of
Stage 1 aircraft, and the transition to Stage 3 aircraft by 1999.65
The Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990 also restricts the
ability of municipalities and airports to restrict noise, in part to
encourage the development of additional airport capacity.66 For
example, the statute limits local restrictions on Stage 2 aircraft
unless an airport operator goes through a formal notice proce-
dure.6 7 The statute specifically provides:
No airport noise or access restriction shall include a restriction
on operations of Stage 2 aircraft, unless the airport operator pub-
lishes the proposed noise or access restriction and prepares and
makes available for public comment at least 180 days before the
effective date of the restriction-
(1) an analysis of the anticipated or actual costs and benefits of
the existing or proposed noise or access restriction;
(2) a description of alternative restrictions; and
(3) a description of the alternative measures considered that
does not involve aircraft restrictions, and a comparison of the
costs and benefits of such alternative measures to the costs and
benefits of the proposed noise or access restriction.6"
Section 2153(h) (currently 49 U.S.C. § 47524) of the Act pro-
vides, however, that the statute does not supercede existing law
with respect to "airport noise or access restrictions by local au-
thorities.''9 Nevertheless, in light of existing statutes in force, it
could be argued that this provision has the effect of further re-
stricting the ability of airports to pursue noise mitigation, if pro-
64 See id. § 47523(b).
65 See 14 C.F.R. § 36.1(f) (1992) (discussing classifications); 14 C.F.R. § 91.807
(1992) (calling for phase-in of Stage 3 aircraft).
6f See Airport Noise and Capacity Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, Title IX,
Subtitle D, 104 Stat. 1388-378 (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2158
(Supp. 1991)).
67 See 49 U.S.C. § 47524 (1999) (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. § 2153(c)
(1999)).
68 Id.
I6 d. § 47533 (1999) (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. § 2153(h)).
460
THE RIGHTS OF LANDOWNERS
posed regulations even marginally affect air transportation
capacity or interstate commerce. v
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF LOCAL ORDINANCES
Over the last fifty years, courts have attempted to determine
how to balance the power of the Federal government to regulate
commerce through its statutory framework, and municipalities'
police power to regulate aircraft noise on its citizens' behalf.
Courts generally limit local municipal powers under the federal
preemption doctrine. The doctrine stems from the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution which states " [t] his Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding. '"' Courts generally construe federal stat-
utes as preemptive under three circumstances: first Congress
may expressly preempt state law in the statute; second, absent
express preemption, federal law may have an "implied preemp-
tive effect" if Congress intended to "occupy the field" of regula-
tion, or where federal law is so pervasive that states have no
room to supplement the law; finally, preemption occurs where
the state law hinders the execution of the purposes and objec-
tives of Congress. 2 Generally, the preemption doctrine restricts
the ability of local and state agencies to pass laws and ordinances
governing airport operations. Problems typically occur when a
state or local agency attempts to restrict the types of planes us-
ing an airport, or impose curfews on times that planes may fly
into airports.
In All Am. Airways v. Village of Cedarhurst,7 the Village of Ce-
darhurst passed an ordinance preventing aircraft from flying
lower than 1,000 feet when passing over residential areas. The
village alleged that the aircraft represented a public nuisance
70 See Christopher S. Marchese, The Dormant Commerce Clause and Airport Noise: A
Case for Narrow Judicial Review, 44 BAYLOR L. REV. 645, 665 n.112 (1992) (citing 49
U.S.C. § 2153(h) and 56 Fed. Reg. 48,661, 48,662 (1991)).
71 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
72 See Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778, 782-83 (6th Cir. 1996); see
also Country Aviation, Inc. v. Tinicurn Township, Civ. A. No. 92-3017, 1992 WL
396782 at *3 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
73 All Am. Airways v. Village of Cedarhurst, 201 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1953).
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and constituted trespass over public property."4 The District
Court for the Eastern District of New York granted an injunction
pendente lite, 5 enjoining enforcement of the ordinance. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to overturn the
lower court's injunction and validate the ordinance. The court
stated that there was "a sufficient question of the validity of the
Cedarhurst ordinance as against the supremacy of national
power so that we are in no way justified in now declaring it
valid.... ."" Nevertheless, the court expressed an unwillingness
to hold that the ordinance was per se preempted by federal
statute.77
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc.,78 the Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, affirmed a decision by
the Ninth Circuit invalidating a noise control ordinance on the
grounds that federal law preempted the local ordinance. A ma-
jority of the Court held that local governments are preempted
by federal statute from enacting regulations through the exer-
cise of their municipal police powers that directly affect inter-
state commerce. Justice Douglas noted:
If we were to uphold the Burbank ordinance and significant
number of municipalities followed suit, it is obvious that fraction-
alized control of the timing of takeoffs and landings would se-
verely limit the flexibility of the FAA in controlling air traffic
flow. The difficulties in scheduling flights to avoid congestion
and the concomitant decrease in safety would be compounded.79
The Court concluded that the legislative objectives in the
Noise Control Act of 1972 left no room for local control.8 0 The
FAA's effort to balance safety and efficiency in the air transpor-
tation system required a "uniform and exclusive" system of fed-
eral regulations."' Nevertheless, the Court determined that local
governments could legitimately regulate land use around air-
74 See id. at 275; see also infra Part VIII.
75 Pendente lite translates to "pending the lawsuit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1134 (6th ed. 1990).
71i All Am. Airways, 201 F.2d at 276.
77 See id. at 277.
78 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 626 (1973).
79 See id. at 639.
80 See id. at 638. See generally San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 651
F.2d 1306 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied 455 U.S. 1000 (1982) (holding that under
the Quiet Communities Act of 1978, Congress intended to preserve federal pre-
emption of state regulation in the areas of airspace management and noise
control).
81 See Burbank, 411 U.S. at 638.
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ports, under what has been called the "proprietor exception. '"82
Justice Douglas appeared to draw a distinction between munici-
palities exercising control as proprietors and municipalities ex-
ercising police powers in a way that conflicts with Federal law. s"
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent, argued that because noise reg-
ulation was traditionally an area of local concern, federal stat-
utes should not supercede local police powers unless Congress
expressed a "clear and manifest purpose" for federal law to pre-
empt local ordinances.14 Justice Rehnquist noted that "control
of noise, sufficiently loud to be classified as a public nuisance at
common law, would be a type of regulation well within the tradi-
tional scope of police power possessed by states and local gov-
erning bodies. '8 5 Justice Rehnquist concluded that if Congress
intended for federal statutes to preempt a valid exercise of po-
lice power in the form of noise control ordinances, Congress
would have expressly provided for this preemption. 6
More recently, the Sixth Circuit reinterpreted the Burbank de-
cision in Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus. 7 The plaintiff brought
suit challenging city ordinances that prohibited the operation of
seaplanes on the surface of Lake Aigelus. The city asserted that
the ordinances were intended to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens, and were designed to minimize
the destruction of property values and the deleterious effects of
noise and pollution on the use and enjoyment of land."8 The
plaintiff argued that Congress promulgated a scheme of federal
regulation so pervasive that the court could reasonably infer
that Congress did not intend for the states to supplement or
change the law.8 9
The district court agreed, and applying Burbank's rationale,
held that the Federal Aviation Act expressly declared that the
United States exercised exclusive national sovereignty over air-
space, and that regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act
comprehensively governed the aircraft operations at issue in
Gustafson.9°' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit stated that although
82 See id. at 635 n.14.
83 See id.
84 See City of Burbank, 411 U.S. at, 643. justices Stewart, White, and Marshall
joined in the dissent.
85 Id. at 643.
86 See id. at 653.
87 Gustafson v. City of Lake Angelus, 76 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 1996).
88 See id. at 781.
89 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
90 See Gustafson, 76 F.3d at 783.
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federal regulations clearly established that noise regulation is a
field completely occupied by the federal government, no such
scheme of federal regulation existed with respect to ordinances
governing aircraft operations on the ground.9' 1 The court noted
that the Act expressly exempted local land use planning and
zoning from federal regulations governing ground-based opera-
tions. 2 The court upheld the autonomy of local municipalities
to regulate airport facilities through the exercise of traditional
local police powers in the absence of express congressional in-
tent to preempt local zoning. 9"
In reaching its conclusion, the court distinguished between
federal regulation of airspace and local regulation of the sur-
face, in part relying on Justice Rehnquist's explanation that lo-
cal governments could extend their police powers to any
ground-based activity. ' The regulation of land and water use,
the issuance of construction permits, or other "ground space"
control thus conformed to Burbank's recognition that Congress
only intended to regulate aircraft "in flight. '95 Gustafson sug-
gests that local governing bodies have exclusive control over air
transportation up until the moment that the plane lifts off of the
ground and enters airspace. This interpretation hampers the
ability of local regulating bodies to plan adequately on the basis
of overall noise impacts. Gustafson seems to indicate that al-
though local planning bodies can regulate every aspect of land
development, the same governing bodies must stop regulating
the moment a plane enters airspace, although the noise contin-
ues to impact the land.
Burbank and Gustafson also contradict other case authority
dealing with causes of action where noise impacts affect land-
owners' use and enjoyment of land, or constitute an unconstitu-
tional property deprivation.' Under these causes of action,
some courts have held that plaintiffs may sue when noise ad-
versely impacts their property, using Fifth Amendment claims of
91 See id.
"1 See id. at 785 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 157.7(a) (year)).
93 See Gustafson, 76 F.3d at, 787 (relying on Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Bur-
bank in which he stated that a local governing agency could exercise its police
powers to control zoning for facilities within its territorial jurisdiction).
94 See id. (quoting Burbank, 411 U.S. at 643, in which Justice Rehnquist ana-
lyzed the legislative history of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and comments by
Senator Monroney, the author of the Act, that the FAA would not have control
over the ground space of airports).
95 See id.
96 See Parts VII and VII1.
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"compensatory takings." These decisions are difficult to recon-
cile with Gustafson's rationale that federal regulations, with re-
spect to noise, conclusively preempt local regulations governing
land use around airports that affect interstate commerce. Gus-
tafson's rationale suggests that local municipalities cannot mini-
mize the risk of loss to property owners by reducing the external
effects of jet engine noise. Instead, courts must look to the fed-
eral regulatory scheme to address the varying impacts of noise.
Such uniformity is difficult when the noise impacts vary by the
type of engine, frequency of airfield operations, characterization
of flights as military or civilian, and the extent to which local
landowners acquiesce to operations upon adequate notice. A
completely preemptive federal regulatory scheme also prevents
local airport operators and government agencies from minimiz-
ing the risk of litigation by voluntarily adopting noise control
ordinances.
Although the Gustafson decision restores some local control,
Justice Rehnquist's dissent goes further by not limiting the exer-
cise of police power solely to ground-based activity. Justice
Rehnquist instead stated that the legislative history of the 1968
noise control amendment to the Federal Aviation Act, and the
subsequent 1972 Noise Control Act, provided for local land use
planning as a means of controlling the noise impacts on com-
munities surrounding airports. Justice Rehnquist further
noted that the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce specifically advocated the cooperation of state and
local governments in achieving noise control.98 Justice Rehn-
quist concluded from the legislative history that Congress in-
tended only that the FAA regulate the "source" of noise,
specifically the "mechanical and structural aspects ofjet and tur-
bine aircraft design."' The statute did not, however, limit the
states from "enacting every type of measure, which might have
the effect of reducing aircraft noise . . ."'... Justice Rehnquist's
dissent suggests that so long as local or state governments do not
regulate aircraft noise emissions directly, for example by requir-
ing aircraft to meet certain noise standards or requiring certain
technical modifications to jet engine design, they are free to reg-
ulate noise for the common benefit.
97 See Burbank, 411 U.S. at 647.
98 See id.
9 Id. at 650.
too Id. at 650-51.
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Justice Rehnquist's analysis more reasonably interprets local
police power over land use, because it reconciles the impor-
tance of federal regulation of noise at its source with local regu-
lation of noise impacts on the ground. Justice Rehnquist
recognized that "control of noise, sufficiently loud to be classi-
fied as a public nuisance at common law, would be a type of
regulation well within the traditional scope of police power pos-
sessed by States and local governing bodies."""' Justice Rehn-
quist also summarized the "demanding and vexing" problem of
balancing the needs of air transportation with the needs of com-
munities "frequently burdened [by noise] to the point where
they can neither enjoy nor reasonably use their land because
of ... aircraft operations which create the unwanted noise."'1 2
Furthermore, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that under the pro-
prietor exception in Burbank, a local governing body would have
the authority to permanently close down air facilities, or prevent
the expansion of an airport within its territory." 3 Justice Rehn-
quist concluded that if local police powers can extend to these
actions, far less intrusive noise control ordinances would be ap-
propriate under the same standard. Justice Rehnquist's opinion
suggests that local communities have a valid interest in preserv-
ing the rights of local property owners against excess noise."4
Recently, the Second Circuit applied the Burbank proprietor
exception to the federal preemption doctrine to conclude that
the City of New York could impose curfews on airport opera-
tions for the purpose of restricting noise.' 5 In National Helicop-
101 Burbank, 411 U.S. at 643.
102 Id. at 647.
103 See id. at 653.
104 Additionally, the composition of the Supreme Court has significantly
changed. The current court may reinterpret the proprietor's exception to allow
for greater zoning authority in local government bodies. See generally Pamela B.
Stein, Comment, The Price of Success: Mitigation and Litigation in Airport Growth, 57 J.
AIR L. & COM. 513, 525 (1991) (noting the changed composition of the court).
105 See National Helicopter Corp. v. City of New York, 137 F.3d 81, 92 (2d Cir.
1998); see also Alaska Airlines Inc. v. City of Long Beach, 951 F.2d 977, 982 (9th
Cir. 1991) (holding that goal of reducing airport noise to control liability and
improve environment was permissible exercise of local police powers); British
Airways Bd. v. Port Auth., 558 F.2d 75, 85 (2d Cir. 1977) (stating that Congress
reserved to airport proprietors the authority to enact reasonable noise regula-
tions because they are in the best position to protect public safety); City of Bur-
bank v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 72 Cal. App. 4th 366, 379, 85
Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 4901 (1999) for the
proposition that "a local regulation may not restrict the use of aircraft or directly
control aircraft emissions, but may otherwise use its land-use powers to mitigate
the noise.").
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ter, the court held that the city could use its police powers under
the proprietor exception to impose noise control conditions on
a special permit issued to National Helicopter Corporation."1 "
The court noted that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 spe-
cifically preserved the ability of local and state government agen-
cies to carry out their proprietary powers and rights under a
cooperative scheme with the federal government. 11°7 Local au-
thorities could exercise these powers without restriction, so long
as they did not promulgate unreasonable, arbitrary or discrimi-
natory regulations, or interfere with pricing, routes, or air car-
rier service.108
V. IMPACT OF LOCAL ZONING ON
AIRPORT OPERATIONS
The federal government has not been willing to supersede
completely the ability of municipalities to control land within
their borders. Local ordinances subject airports and surround-
ing landowners to varying land use requirements. The situation
has led to a patchwork quilt of zoning ordinances that impact
the ability of airports to expand. Air carriers, faced with an un-
certain zoning scheme, frequently must endure capacity con-
straints in some airports, but not in others. As a practical
matter, zoning that favors particular airports tends to give air
carriers incentive to relocate to those airports to take advantage
of increased capacity. An air carrier that flies out of an airport
with liberal zoning requirements can take advantage of greater
capacity to increase the number of flights at a particular time,
and thereby increase market share, load factors, and yields. By
shifting their operations, air carriers can avoid unfavorable zon-
ing schemes.
Conflicts among different local ordinances, stemming from
the effort to attract airlines with liberalized regulations, can cre-
ate adverse impacts on the legal rights of landowners to sue for
loss of enjoyment of property, trespass, or damage to property.
The market power of air carriers in some instances forces mu-
106 See National Helicopter Corp., 137 F.3d at 88-89.
107 See id. at 88; see also Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92
Stat. 1705 (1978), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b) (3) (1999) (noting that nothing
in the Act "shall be construed to limit the authority of any State or political subdi-
vision ... as the owner or operator of an airport served by any air carrier.., to
exercise its proprietary powers and rights.").
108 See National Helicopter Corp., 137 F.3d at 88-89; see also 49 U.S.C.
§ 41713(b)(1) (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a) (1999)).
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nicipalities to restrict the rights of landowners, and potentially
encourages other regulatory agencies to rubberstamp expansion
plans. While this can be a problem for landowners with noise
concerns, municipalities have a legitimate interest in ensuring
that local airports have the broadest possible capability to serve
air passengers, or lose out on the economic development bene-
fits of a large airport. Restrictive zoning may protect the inter-
ests of a vocal minority of citizens, but have a drastically negative
effect on a regional economy if air carriers shift operations else-
where to take advantage of capacity.
Airports typically protect themselves by advocating for zoning
ordinances that prevent certain land uses from encroaching
within a certain distance of airport property or restrict the
height of land uses in order to ensure the safety of aerial ap-
proaches to runways. Despite these protections, severe en-
croachment frequently occurs with concomitant noise impacts
on the encroaching property." 9 In order to protect airports
from encroachment, nearly every state has adopted enabling
statutes that grant authority to local governments to promulgate
special airport zoning regulations that restrict incompatible
land uses."" Many jurisdictions have also developed "overlay
zoning" plans that map separate zoning provisions on top of ex-
isting zoning districts in order to encourage different forms of
development."' Additionally, general standards organizations
have developed uniform zoning laws that serve as blueprints for
land use planning around airports." 12 The Standard State Zon-
109 See Magee, supra note 4, at 246-47 (noting that "[s]evere encroachment of
existing airports, by incompatible land uses, increase[s] the problem of aircraft
noise and its adverse impact on adjacent property [and] limits the full utilization
of airport facilities.").
M' See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 02.05.020 (Michie 1999); CAL. Gov. CODE § 50485.3
(West 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 333.03 (West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. § 6-3-22
(1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 262-3 (1996); 620 ILL. COMP. STAT. 25/13 (West 1999);
IND. CODE § 8-21-12-13 (1991); MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. I §§ 5-4A-01, 5-502
(1993); Micti. COMP. LAWS § 259.445 (1990); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 356 (McKin-
ney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 63-31 (1985); Oiiio REV. CODE ANN. § 4536.031
(West 1999); 74 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5912 (West 1999); TENN. CODE ANN. § 42-
6-103 (1999); TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 241.011 (West 1999); WASH. REV.
CODE § 14.12.030 (1992). See generally 14 C.F.R. § 151.26. (1995) (requiring air-
port to show that it has taken action to restrict non-compatible uses around air-
port property through zoning and acquisition of property interests in order to
receive federal funding for proposed expansions).
M See Magee, supra note 4, at 269-73 (discussing overlay zoning and citing
cases approving overlay zoning plans as legitimate exercises of local zoning
authority).
112 See id. at 258, 261.
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ing Enabling Act (SZEA) and the ALI Model Land Development
Code provide guidance on comprehensive master planning that
would designate airport property as specially planned zones. ' "
The ALl Model Land Development Code would enable the de-
velopment of a "precise plan" that would permit land develop-
ment only after consideration of noise impacts, identify areas for
future airport expansion, prohibit land development inconsis-
tent with the plan, and resolve existing non-conforming land
uses. 1
1 4
In addition to zoning, other possible alternatives would de-
crease the potential impacts of non-conforming land uses on air-
ports and surrounding landowners. 1 5 For example, airports
can acquire interests such as easements in surrounding property
in order to prevent or mitigate non-compatible use, or acquire
land for future use as part of a comprehensive development
strategy."' Property owners can relocate to less noise-impacted
areas, allowing surrounding property to be redeveloped. Iv Lo-
cal governments can engage in noise compatibility planning, re-
quire property to be soundproofed under appropriate building
code provisions, and develop purchase assurance programs that
would guarantee the sale of property at fair market value subject
to aviation easements." 8 One commentator recommends the
use of "transferable development rights," creating a market for
development credits in which property owners can transact in
credits sufficient to allow them to expand their property. A lim-
ited supply of transferable rights would ensure the development
is slowed to a more controllable pace."I
Courts have wrestled with the power of local authorities to
promulgate zoning ordinances. Generally, local governments
can control land use around airports so long as zoning ordi-
nances are a reasonable and proper exercise of local police pow-
ers. '20 The validity of a zoning ordinance depends on meeting
two elements: (1) Does the zoning regulation substantially relate
I' See id.
114 See id. at 265.
115 SeeJeffrey Schoen, Comment, Airport Noise: How State and Local Government
Can Protect Airportsfrom Urban Encroachment, 1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 309, 310 (1986).
'Il See id. at 320.
117 See id.
118 See id.
I 119 See id.
2O See Magee, supra note 4 at 254. Cf Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena
Airport Auth., 39 Cal. 3d 862, 705 P.2d 866, 868 n.4, 218 Cal. Rptr. 293 (Cal.
1985) (stating in dicta that allegations of unreasonable zoning permit remedy
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to public health, safety, and general welfare; and (2) Is the pub-
lic interest sufficient for the reasonable imposition of restric-
tions on property adjacent to an airport, without having to
compensate the property owner for loss of property value?' 21
The public interest in zoning might be demonstrated by arguing
that a zoning regulation ensures the safety of people living near
the airport. Airport authorities might also argue that transpor-
tation is a per se predominant interest that encourages eco-
nomic growth.
Cases involving local zoning and airports typically fall into five
categories. First, landowners challenge local zoning ordinances
that designate certain areas as "airport hazard areas" and pre-
vent development inconsistent with the hazard designation in
the interests of public safety.' 22 Second, landowners assert that
zoning ordinances are violations of equal protection under the
U.S. and state constitutions, or challenge a particular zoning or-
dinance as an illegal government taking in violation of due pro-
cess.123 Third, landowners challenge zoning restrictions that
prevent them from developing private airports or helipads inci-
dental to other business activities. 124 Fourth, landowners argue
not by inverse condemnation, but by declaratory relief or mandamus); supra note
105 and accompanying text.
121 See Magee, supra note 4, at 254; see also infra Part VII discussing takings
claims.
122 See generally Citizens for Equal Property Rights v. Board of Supervisors, 730
So. 2d 1141 (Miss. 1999) (holding that an ordinance zoning property in order to
prevent "hazardous" structures from obstructing flight paths was in substantial
compliance with state authorizing statute); Northwest Properties v. Outagamie
County, 589 N.W.2d 683 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that statute authorizing
zoning for protection of aerial approaches to airport runways permitted munici-
pality to limit residential units to minimum lot sizes); City of Bridgeport v. Town
of Stratford, No. CV 890257140, 1997 WL 430655 at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1997)
(holding that comprehensive statutory scheme for regulation of airport hazards
imposed mandatory duty on Town of Stratford to establish airport hazard zones).
123 See generally Comes v. City of Atlantic, 601 N.W.2d 93 (Iowa 1999) (holding
that the city could obtain a conditional use permit for airport expansion, and
that permit was a reasonable exercise of eminent domain consistent with the Tak-
ings Clause); City of Kansas City v. Hon, 972 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998)
(holding that because the city could not adopt zoning regulations applicable to
landowners outside the city limits, city's proposed condemnation of land for air-
port expansion was a matter of "public necessity"); Schmidt v. City of Kerosha,
Wis. 2d 527, 571 N.W.2d 892 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that plaintiffs equal
protection claim failed because zoning ordinances were rationally related to the
reasonable state purpose of promoting safety along aerial approaches).
124 See generally Capital Region Airport Auth. v. Carter Township, N.W.2d 141
(Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that airport authority had to comply with local
ordinances to build non-aeronautical facility on airport property); Bonte v. Town
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that non-conforming uses prior to enactment of new zoning reg-
ulations should be exempted from new requirements. 25 Fi-
nally, landowners challenge local zoning ordinances that do not
comply with coordinated planning processes, including airport
development plans or regional master plans. 126
VI. USE OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS IN
LOCAL PLANNING
During the land-use planning process, federal statutes such as
the NEPA require an airport to develop an EIS prior to con-
struction of additional facilities that is subject to public com-
ment, if that airport wants to receive federal grants.1 27 An EIS
complies with NEPA requirements if it takes a "hard look" at the
environmental impact of proposed construction.' 2 The defini-
tion of "hard look" is not clear in the NEPA, and has been vari-
ously interpreted by courts. To a large extent, Congress has
limited the ability of individuals to sue for damages from noise
exposure if they received proper notice of planned airport ex-
pansions or modifications. Section 47506 of Title 49 eliminates
private rights of action for damages stemming from excess noise
for persons "acquiring an interest in property after February 18,
Bd. of Fishkill, 670 N.Y.S.2d 597 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that private
owner had to comply with applicable zoning ordinances to use his property as a
private helipad incidental to his business); Tanis v. Township of Hampton, 704
A.2d 62 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (holding that zoning applied to plan for
private helipad incidental to business).
125 See generally Clackamas County v. Gay, 986 P.2d 588 (Or. Ct. App. 1999)
(holding that statute preventing local governments from limiting future airport
uses did not extend to existing airport uses prohibited by judicial decision);
North/South Airpark Assoc. v. Haagen, 942 P.2d 1068 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that appellant could retain "grandfathered rights" allowing it to con-
tinue using a landing strip extension because it had a "prior nonconforming use"
before new zoning ordinance was passed); Riggs v. Burson, 941 S.W.2d 44 (Tenn.
1997) (holding that heliport operators could not maintain "prior nonconform-
ing use" because statute specifically required operations to be eliminated within
statutory period).
126 See, e.g., City of Des Moines v. Puget Sound Reg'] Council, 988 P.2d 993
(Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that regional comprehensive master plan pre-
vailed over inconsistent local zoning ordinances); Board of County Comm'rs v.
City of Olathe, 952 P.2d 1302 (Kan. 1998) (holding that although proposed local
zoning regulation conflicted with comprehensive master plan, zoning authority
had the right to "prescribe, change, or refuse to change zoning" as long as the
action was reasonable).
127 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d
(1999); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
128 See id. § 4332(2) (C).
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1980, in an area surrounding an airport for which a noise expo-
sure map has been submitted under section 47503129 of [Title
49] and having actual or constructive knowledge of the exis-
tence of the map .... ,130 A person is deemed to have construc-
tive knowledge of the existence of a noise exposure map if
notice is published at least three times in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county in which the airport operates, or the
person is given a copy of the map when she acquires the prop-
erty interest.13
1
In addition to noise exposure maps, the NEPA requires air-
port planners to explore reasonable alternatives to a proposed
action. In City of Richfield v. Federal Aviation Admin., the Eighth
Circuit required that a "reasonable alternative" at least meet the
goals of the airport project to comply with the NEPA. 132 In this
case, the Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) proposed
building a taxiway and altering flight patterns at Minneapolis-St.
Paul International Airport in order to shift noise impacts from
the northwest area of the airport to the southwest. The MAC
also proposed soundproofing homes near the southwestern
edge of the airport in an effort to mitigate the increased noise.
The MAC's goal was to more equitably distribute noise impacts
to landowners along the western side of the airport.' The
court noted that several federal statutes, including the NEPA,
require an airport to develop an EIS that examines "reasonable"
or "possible and prudent" alternatives to a proposed project." 4
An alternative is "unreasonable" if it does not accomplish the
goals of the project. 13 5 The city argued that the MAC should
have examined the possibility of establishing noise mitigation
measures such as soundproofing for homes near the northwest
quadrant of the airport, where the majority of noise impact oc-
curred.3 6 The Eighth Circuit upheld the MAC's plan, however,
because the city's suggested alternative was inconsistent with the
purpose of equitably distributing noise impacts among as many
129 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
130 49 U.S.C. § 47506 (1999).
131 See id. § 47506(b); see also Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 938
F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
132 152 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cii. 1998).
1"' See id. at 906.
134 See id. at 907; see also 49 U.S.C. § 47106(c)(1)(C) (1994); 40 C.F.R.
§ 1502.14(a) (1999) (implementing the NEPA).
135 See City of Richfield, 152 F.3d at 907.
136 See id.
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landowners as possible, and was therefore unreasonable. 13 7 The
Court noted that "soundproofing homes would merely limit
noise impact, and would have no effect whatsoever on noise out-
doors or inside buildings other than the soundproofed
homes."13
Other courts have interpreted the "reasonableness" require-
ment of the NEPA as a procedural guideline that does not nec-
essarily require that the agency adopt more "reasonable"
alternatives. 9 Recently, in Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, Inc.
v. Dalton, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia assessed the reasonableness of a Final Environ-
mental Impact Statement produced by the Navy in support of its
plan to transfer naval aircraft to the Virginia Beach Naval Air
Station. 140 In order to comply with the NEPA, federal agencies
must prepare an EIS discussing the environmental impacts of a
proposed action, possible reasonable alternatives, and the rea-
sons why the agency eliminated alternatives. 4 ' The court deter-
mined that the NEPA did not place any substantive
requirements on federal agencies to weigh environmental im-
pacts. 14 2 Instead, the NEPA only required that federal agencies
"consider" environmental concerns in their deliberative
processes. 13 The NEPA process "does not mandate a particular
outcome, but only describes the process necessary to reach an
informed decision." '144 Thus, agencies can freely choose a
course of action that has greater environmental impact as long
as "reasonable" alternatives are addressed and "other values"
outweigh these impacts. 4 w Relevant factors that can, on bal-
ance, trump environmental concerns include economic and
technical considerations, national policy, and agency statutory
missions. 146
137 See id.
138 City of Richfield, 152 F.3d at 907.
139 See Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, Inc. v. Dalton, 48 F. Supp. 2d 582
(E.D. Va. 1999); see also Valley Citizens for a Safe Env't. v. Aldridge, 695 F. Supp.
605, 613-14 (D. Mass. 1988).
14" See Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 585.
141 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1999); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14-1502.16 (1999).
142 See Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
143 See id.
144 Id. at 588-89 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332 (1989)).
145 See Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 589.
146 See id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2 (1999)).
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The court also found that there was no basis in fact or law for
the plaintiff's assertion that the EIS was inadequate. 4 7 The
plaintiff alleged a series of problems with the EIS, including a
flawed cost-benefit analysis, the failure to consider reasonable
alternatives or practical noise mitigation measures, and the fail-
ure to address foreseeable environmental impacts resulting
from the "cumulative impact" of higher noise from the F/A-18
"Hornet" aircraft.'48 The court determined that the Navy's op-
erational requirements, and the recommendations of the Base
Realignment and Closure Commission (pursuant to the Defense
Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990), resulted in the
choice of Virginia Beach as the best possible location for opera-
tions based on several criteria, including environmental im-
pact.'49 With respect to the EIS noise measurements, the court
deferred to the agencies' scientific methodology, noting that the
plaintiffs noise arguments "basically constitute[d] a dispute
over non-material matters."' "5 The court's reasoning suggests
that EIS alternatives and noise measurement methodology are
"reasonable" when the decision-making process considers all rel-
evant factors, and procedural due process is satisfied, for exam-
ple by notice and comment procedures, open meetings, and
solicitation of community opinions. Furthermore, noise mea-
surements are within the "sound discretion""'' of the agency,
limiting the likelihood that a plaintiff can successfully challenge
the underlying data used to justify an airport development or
expansion project.
With respect to the potential costs of increased noise on sur-
rounding property values, the court concluded that the mea-
surement of noise impacts and costs would be too speculative to
require the Navy to engage in a precise cost-benefit analysis.' 52
In essence, the court concluded that it is practically impossible
to determine exactly what factors result in decreased property
values. The court agreed with the Navy's argument that:
Property values are determined by a combination of neighbor-
hood characteristics (e.g., the quality of local schools, local prop-
erty taxes, access to transportation, and the crime rate) and
individual housing characteristics (e.g., age of the house, num-
147 See id. at 589-90.
148 See id. at 589.
14 See id. at 590-93.
150 Id. at 593-94.
151 See Citizens Concerned About Jet Noise, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 596.
152 See id. at 597-98.
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ber of rooms, and amenities such as garages). There are no de-
finitive federal standards for quantifying the impact of aircraft
noise on property values."5 3
On this basis, the court concluded that because the EIS
plainly explained the difficulty in precisely measuring the cost-
benefits of the proposed action, the Navy did not act arbitrarily
or capriciously in failing to quantify these impacts." 4 The
court's conclusion stems from its interpretation of the NEPA as
a set of guidelines, in which reasonableness is not measured by
the potential impact of aircraft operations on landowners, but
by de minimis compliance with the procedural requirements.
Such a conclusion suggests that even if a landowner has a col-
orable claim of property damage, courts should not scrutinize
an agency's determination unless there is proof of procedural
flaws in the agency's actions. Such a conclusion not only affects
the procedural requirements of an EIS, but also potentially pre-
vents an individual from collecting damages based on a legiti-
mate takings claim, discussed below in Part VII. More
importantly, the court misinterprets the NEPA's purpose hold-
ing that it merely provides a set of procedural requirements ne-
gates the purpose of the Act. The Act requires that any
proposed federal action with significant impact on the quality of
the human environment should include an EIS.'55 In the Con-
gressional declaration of purpose for the NEPA, Congress stated
that
The purposes of this chapter are: To declare a national policy
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony be-
tween man and his environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere
and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the un-
derstanding of the ecological systems and natural resources im-
portant to the Nation; and to establish a Council on
Environmental Quality.156
By deferring to an agency's unilateral balancing of factors rel-
evant only to its own priorities, and allowing agencies to con-
clude that environmental impacts are outweighed by other
concerns, the purpose of preventing actions with significant en-
vironmental impacts is negated. Nevertheless, courts have, for
153 Id. at 598 n.16.
154 See id. at 598-99.
155 See id.
156 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1999).
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the most part, determined that an agency meets NEPA require-
ments by listing alternatives and providing a reasonable explana-
tion for proceeding with a less environmentally desirable
alternative. 15
7
VII. "TAKINGS" CLAIMS AND INVERSE CONDEMNATION
Unlike environmental claims, landowners have some success
in collecting damages from the federal government on the the-
ory that airfields and military air bases operated by the govern-
ment "take" property without just compensation, in violation of
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion. 158 Courts have also applied the Takings Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment 59 to the states in situations where a
state agency takes a property right through an illegal depriva-
tion of property. Thus, the holdings on the federal level with
respect to government takings can be analogized to similar
causes of action brought against state government takings.
Using a takings cause of action, a landowner asserts that a gov-
ernment taking of a property right constitutes a compensable
injury. Suits can be brought as inverse condemnation actions, in
which a property owner seeking just compensation for land
taken for a public use sues a government or private entity having
the power of eminent domain.160 In the context of noise im-
pacts from airport expansions, this cause of action has not been
effective because of the difficulty of linking damages in the form
of lower real estate values with noise when other factors may
have more direct impact on declining property values." 6' To
avoid the difficulties of determining liability and measuring
noise-related damages, courts have been willing to draw a bright
line: flights a certain distance above the property do not trigger
a Takings Clause cause of action. Additionally, landowners near
airports may not have suffered a substantial or material decrease
in property value warranting relief.16 2 The assumption that
157 As discussed in this section, courts hold that 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) re-
quires only that impacts and alternatives be considered, not necessarily adopted.
158 "[P]rivate property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just com-
pensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59 "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
16 See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 830 (7th ed. 1999).
I'l See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
162 See Pamela B. Stein, Comment, The Price of Success: Mitigation and Litigation
in Airport Growth, 57,. AIR L. & COM. 513, 555-56 (1991).
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homeowners do not suffer a substantial decrease in property
value may be flawed because even if property values do not ma-
terially change over time, economic impacts may still arise when
property values increase at a decreasing rate compared with
homes farther away from sources of noise. Arguably, these op-
portunity costs arising from declines in real estate value growth
can still be considered a "taking" of property value in which
landowners lose the opportunity to sell property at the poten-
tially higher market rate.
One situation, in which plaintiffs have asserted an illegal gov-
ernment taking, is in the instance of direct flights over areas
surrounding airports. The Supreme Court addressed the issue
of property damage from over flights in the seminal case of
United States v. Causby.'63 In that case, the plaintiff sued for dam-
ages caused to the plaintiffs home and chicken farm, alleging a
government taking as a result of military flights within 83 feet of
the plaintiffs property."64 Accepting the argument that the Civil
Aeronautics Act granted the United States "exclusive national
sovereignty" over airspace,'65 the Court repudiated the common
law view that ownership of land extends to the "periphery of the
universe."' 6 6 The Court stated that the common law concept
needed to give way to the modern notion that airspace is a pub-
lic highway, and private claims to airspace would "clog these
highways.' 1 67 Nevertheless, the Court recognized that under
some circumstances, flights over land could constitute a taking
of an easement that deprived owners of property value.' 6 The
Court concluded that if a landowner is to have "full enjoyment
of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate
reaches of the enveloping atmosphere ... The fact that he does
not occupy it in the physical sense .. .is not material ... [T]he
flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch it, is
as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more con-
ventional entry upon it."' 69 The Court ultimately determined
that the flights complained of in this case were so low and fre-
quent as to directly interfere with the enjoyment and use of the
163 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
164 See id. at 258.
165 See id. at 260; see also 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a) (1994).
'66 Causby, 328 U.S. at 260-61 (quoting I COKE, INSTITUTES, 19th ed. 1832, ch. I
§ 1(4)(a)).
167 Id. at 261.
168 See id. at 261-62.
169 Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
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land, thus entitling plaintiff to just compensation. 17' The Court,
however, declined to speculate on how frequent or low flights
must be to constitute a taking, and remanded to the Court of
Claims to determine the extent of damages. 171
Subsequent courts, interpreting Causby's holding, have at-
tempted to clarify how low planes can fly without triggering a
claim for government taking based on physical interference with
property. 172 Most courts have applied a rule that an agency
might be liable for overflights below 500 feet, but that "flights at
higher altitudes [do] not interfere with the landowner's use of
the surface."173 In some instances, however, a plaintiff may have
a viable cause of action for government taking of property even
though a plane flies within "navigable airspace," and not below
the 500-foot demarcation line. 74 The Supreme Court, in Arm-
strong v. United States, for example, noted the difficulty of trying
to draw a bright line between what property takings were com-
pensable, and what takings were merely "consequential" and
therefore not compensable. 175 Justice Black, writing for the ma-
jority, concluded that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee that
private property shall not be taken for a public use without just
compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."'1 76
In Branning v. United States,177 the Court of Claims dealt with
an action by plaintiffs for just compensation for the taking of an
easement over their property resulting from aircraft operations.
The court held that although the flights were above 500 feet,
these flights nevertheless constituted a taking of an easement
over the plaintiffs property warranting recovery. 17 The court
171 See id. at 266-67.
171 See id. at 267-68.
172 See, e.g., Lacey v. United States, 595 F.2d 614 (Ct. Cl. 1979); Aaron v. United
States, 311 F.2d 798 (Ct. CI. 1963); Matson v. United States, 171 F. Supp. 283 (Ct.
Cl. 1959).
173 Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d 1277, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
174 See Branning v. United States, 654 F.2d 88, 101 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
175 See 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
176 Id. at 49.
177 Branning, 654 F.2d at 88.
178 See id. at 101-102. The Court also noted in dicta that, although the plaintiffs
purchased their property after they had public notice that their property was
designated as unsuitable for residential use, the main issue was whether the
change in frequency and types of planes flying overhead constituted a new tak-
ing. See id. at 94. For a discussion of public notice and noise impact studies, see
infra note 130 and accompanying text.
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noted that in the years following the Supreme Court's decision
in Causby, commentators recognized that noise pollution alone
might constitute an encroachment on private property, even
though aircraft may pass over the property at a considerable dis-
tance. 7 ' Although Congress had plenary power to regulate nav-
igable airspace, 1 ° this congressional authority did not preclude
a claim under the Takings Clause, even where flights operated
within navigable airspace, an area traditionally within Congress'
authority.18 The court disagreed with the "great weight of Fed-
eral authority" that noise impacts alone, without a physical inva-
sion of airspace within 500 feet of the property, was merely
"consequential damage" and thus not compensable under the
Fifth Amendment.1 82 Instead, the court held that because of the
effects of aircraft noise, and the diminution of property value
resulting from that noise, the plaintiff had a viable takings
claim. 183
The court distinguished between the need for safety, which
justifies a judicially created minimum altitude, and minimum
noise levels. Depending on the type of aircraft and frequency of
flights, the level of noise may be considerable even though the
aircraft flies at altitudes above the bright line test set forth in
Causby, Lacey v. United States, and their progeny. For example, in
footnote 22 of the Branning decision, the court stated that glid-
ers produced no noise impact below 500 feet. Gliders might,
however, be a substantial accident risk, warranting a minimum
safe altitude. 18 4 In the instant case, on the other hand, the prop-
erty damage asserted by the plaintiffs arose from the noise im-
pacts as distinguished from physical invasion below a minimum
safe distance.
In a recent case decided in 1997, the Federal Circuit at-
tempted to reconcile the seemingly conflicting opinions of
179 See id. at 97 (citing Airport Noise Regulation: Burbank Aaron and Air Transport,
8 TRANSP. L.J. 403 (1976) and Current State of the Law in Aircraft Noise Pollution
Control, 43J. AIR L. & CoM. 799 (1977)).
is0 "Navigable airspace" was originally defined as airspace above the minimum
safe flight altitudes prescribed by the Civilian Aeronautics Authority. See 49
U.S.C. § 180 (repealed). Section 40102 currently defines "navigable airspace" as
"airspace above the minimum altitudes of flight ... needed to ensure safety in
takeoff and landing of aircraft." 49 U.S.C. § 40102(30) (1999).
181 See Branning, 654 F.2d at 98.
182 See id. at 99.
183 See id. at 102.
184 See id. at 102 n.22.
2000]
480 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [66
Causby and Branning. 5 In Argent v. United States, the Federal
Circuit determined that "overflight takings disputes def [ied] per
se rules" for determining whether potential noise impacts would
give rise to a cause of action. 1 6 Instead, the Federal Circuit an-
nounced a new test that gives a remedy when a government ac-
tion singles one out for a "disproportionate burden" of a public
benefit.8 7 In announcing the new test, the Federal Circuit
noted that Causby continued to provide useful guidance in eval-
uating the strengths of a takings claim, but did not give rise to
an automatic rule under all circumstances.188 Applying its "dis-
proportionate burden" test, the court concluded that the plain-
tiff in Argent stated allegations sufficient to overcome summary
judgment.8 9 The court analogized to the Branning court's con-
clusion that the uniquely noisy and intrusive character of mili-
tary aircraft was a "vital factor" in its decision to allow a Fifth
Amendment cause of action because of the "peculiar burden"
imposed by these aircraft operations. 190 Furthermore, although
the plaintiffs stated in their affidavits that military flights only
"occasionally" flew at low altitudes directly over their property,
the Federal Circuit rejected the government's argument that
these admissions in the record defeated the plaintiffs' claim.
The court noted that the government could not only take pri-
vate property by physical occupancy, "but also by imposing such
burdens upon the use of the property as to deprive the owner of
the enjoyment of the land."19' Thus, the Takings Clause ex-
tends to government actions that are non-invasive, even where
no direct interference with the property occurs. 92
Although the court significantly altered the general Causby
rule, it nevertheless carefully limited its decision to noise im-
pacts resulting from "peculiarly burdensome" flight activity that
"significantly" impaired landowners' use and enjoyment of
land.' 9'3 The Causby 500 feet rule would still apply where the
allegedly harmful noise results from "normal aircraft opera-
tions" in which planes do not fly directly over the plaintiffs
11,5 Argent v. United States, 124 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1997).




19,1 See Argent, 124 F.3d at 1282.
- hd. at 1283.
I 92 See id.
m" See id. at 1284.
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property. 94 The court also noted that the government acquires
an avigation easement over the property where the government
operates aircraft regularly over the land with the intention to
continue these flights indefinitely, and the plaintiff fails to file
suit for alleged taking of private property within six years of the
date on which the cause of action arose.'9 5 The court limited
the effect of easements, however, to the first instance when an
airport or other facility begins regular operations over surround-
ing land.'96 If the frequency of flights or intensity of the noise
increases as a result of operational changes, these changes may
trigger a second taking that allows a plaintiff to file a new cause
of action.'97 The court's opinion creates the possibility that a
landowner may file a claim under the Takings Clause for
changes in activity that place an excessive burden upon him or
her, even though he or she initially acquiesced to the initial gov-
ernment action by failing to pursue his or her remedies in court.
In order to collect remedies from harm caused by increased
over flights, the landowner must still show that the takings claim
is not barred by an existing easement burdening the property.
In City of Austin v. Travis County Landfill Co.,' 98 the Court of Ap-
peals of Texas in Austin noted that the city airport, Austin-Berg-
strom International Airport, acquired an "obstruction"
easement on property owned by a landfill company, granting it
rights to remove obstructions encroaching upon airport lands,
and ingress and egress to clear any obstructions. 9I The court
also noted that the military base formerly located at the airport
acquired an avigation easement that gave it the right of unob-
structed passage in all airspace above the property."' The court
held that the city's obstruction easement did not give it over
flights rights over the landfill property, and the avigation ease-
ment provided only military aircraft, not general or commercial
aircraft, the right of unobstructed passage in the airspace above
Travis County Landfill Company's (TCLC) land.2 °"
194 See id.
'95 See Argent, 124 F.3d at 1285.
196 See id.
197 See id.
198 No. 03-98-00455-CV, 1999 WL 644808 at *1 (Tex. App.-Austin August 26,
1999) (subject to revision or withdrawal until released in the permanent law
reports).
199 See id. at *6.
20 See id.
201 See id. at *7.
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Finding that the city failed to retain an air easement, thus in-
truding on the plaintiffs land, the court then provided a
formula for calculating damages in the type of takings claim as-
serted by the plaintiff. The court indicated that damages are
measured by the difference between the value of the land-
owner's entire tract before the taking and the market value of
the remainder after the taking, allowing for the uses to which
the condemned land is to be subjected. °2 In calculating the
available damages, the fact that the land will be taken cannot be
used in calculating the fair market value.20 3 Such an analysis
might harm the affected landowner, however, because the fact
of taking and subsequent noise impacts might considerably de-
crease market value. By not including the fact of taking in dam-
ages calculations, the landowner may lose more property value
due to noise impacts than would normally occur in the market.
For example, assume that a landowner purchased his or her
property near an existing airport at a price of $100,000. Ten
years after purchasing the property, the airport increases the fre-
quency of over flights by 50%, resulting in greater noise impacts.
As a result of these impacts, the landowner's property devalues
to $70,000. Assume also that the property would currently be
worth $90,000 but for the noise impacts. The landowner would
not be able to obtain a permanent injunction preventing the
additional flights. In the absence of injunctive relief, an airport
can complete a taking and simply pay appropriate compensa-
tion according to the damages formula. Under Travis County
Landfill Co., the market value of the property must be assessed
without regard to the existence of the government taking, which
could mean without regard to the increased noise from over
flights. Thus, under the formula, the landowner will be com-
pensated for $10,000 in damages (property value before the tak-
ing less fair market value without noise impacts) even though
the actual property damages totaled $30,000.
Other interpretations of the court's opinion are possible.
The formula may be designed to prevent a landowner from
202 See id. at *8. Significantly, the court determined that a permanent injunc-
tion could not be a valid remedy because federal law gave the United States gov-
ernment exclusive sovereignty of United States airspace. See id. at *12; see also
supra Part IV.
203 See Travis County Landfill Co., 1999 WL 644808 at *8. Cf United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (stating "[m]arket value fairly determined is the
normal measure of the recovery. And that value may reflect the use to which the
land could readily be converted, as well as the existing use.") (citation omitted).
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claiming damages beyond the immediate loss of the condemned
land (or the diminution of value due to the taking of an ease-
ment), particularly when the remainder may still hold value.
Two possible formulas might be considered:
X - Original appraised value2" B - affected land
Y - Current appraised value A
Entire tract- _
(Formula 1) Damages = X-Y Entiretract___
The representation is not necessarily
(Formula 2) Damages = (B/A)(X-Y) limited to land, but could also be the
property right lost as a result of the
taking
The first formula measures the actual loss of value to the land-
owner as a result of the encumbrance, in this case, the avigation
easement, regardless of the extent of harm to the property. The
second formula, however, requires that the actual loss be limited
to the proportion of the land affected. The second formula also
assumes that Y, the current appraised value of the land, is less
than X, the original appraised value. Otherwise, the formula
produces a negative value; in other words, the landowner takes
nothing. The second formula limits any noise impacts to B, or
the area subject to the avigation easement or other condemned
use. Such a formulation might more accurately reflect the loss
of value because it limits damages specifically to those areas di-
rectly affected; the remainder presumably can continue in pro-
ductive use without the impacts. The second formula, however,
may not reflect other considerations that affect the value of the
property to the landowner. In particular, it ignores the impact
of noise on use and enjoyment of land and the extent to which
sound waves might affect an entire tract."0 4 As other injuries
from noise are considered, (B/A) in the formula approaches
100%, rendering the second formula into a mere restatement of
203 These formulas might lead to different results if X is the original purchase
price and Y is either the current appraised value or the current market value.
The original purchase price may be larger or smaller than the appraised value of
the land at the time of purchase; thus using the original purchase price might
overcompensate or undercompensate the landowner. An argument could be
made, however that court should measure damages based on the actual price as a
reflection of the original expectations of the parties to the contract.
204 See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946).
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the first, i.e., the measurement of the actual loss regardless of
the portion of land directly affected.
Accurate calculation of damages is difficult because of the dif-
ferent variables that can affect valuation. 2 5 Residential land-
owners may not collect full damages if they bought property
subject to notice of existing airport operations or an existing
avigation easement. On the other hand, a commercial devel-
oper would have no claim for damages when real estate is highly
valued due to its location near air transportation. Nonetheless,
developers may suffer economic harm in the form of lost oppor-
tunity because property values might have increased more rap-
idly without the presence of excess noise. Ultimately, such
claims are speculative and difficult to measure.
VIII. THEORIES OF NUISANCE AND TRESPASS
Landowners have also sued airport operators and government
agencies on tort theories of trespass and nuisance. Both causes
of action vary across state jurisdictions and share roots in tort
principles of foreseeability, causation and legal injury, and stat-
utes of limitations/repose. Both claims also involve a careful
balancing of the benefits and costs of the activity causing the
alleged tort, particularly in the context of airport operations.
Under standards of reasonableness, plaintiff landowners not
only must demonstrate that the benefits of ceasing offending
noise outweigh the discounted loss to their property, but they
must also demonstrate that they are entitled to a remedy even
though the airport activity is statutorily protected.
Trespass actions allege harm stemming from the physical inva-
sion of one's property, either intentionally or negligently, when
the invader does not have a right of access. Proving up physical
trespass, as has been shown in Part VII in the context of takings
claims, can be extremely difficult. Generally, an individual is lia-
ble for trespass if he intentionally enters land in possession of
another, remains on the land, or fails to remove an intrusion
which he has a duty to remove.2" 6 Such conduct is classified into
205 See supra note 153 and accompanying text. It may be possible, however, to
correlate noise impacts to lost property value (or opportunity cost if the ap-
praised property value increases at a lower rate than similar property outside of
noise-affected areas) if noise contour maps were overlaid on maps showing real
estate valuations. Any resulting correlation through the overlay maps might
more accurately demonstrate the relationship between noise and appraised
value.
206 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1963-1964 Main Vol.).
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either continuing trespasses, in which the possessor suffers dam-
age from an unprivileged presence on his property during the
entire duration of the tortious conduct, or separate trespasses,
in which the possessor only suffers damage caused in the short
duration of each particular intrusion. 2"7 An individual's con-
duct is not a trespass if it is privileged, either by the consent of
the possessor, or by law.208 Aircraft flights above another's land
may be trespassory if such flights enter into the "immediate
reaches" of air space and such an intrusion "interferes substan-
tially" with a person's use and enjoyment of land.20 9 Such pro-
tection does not extend to the edges of space, but is limited to
the immediate reach of the affected property.210 Protection
against trespass is also denied unless there is an actual interfer-
ence with a property right, as opposed to a potential or prospec-
tive interference.
211
Even if an interference with a possessory right is not within
the "immediate reaches" of land, the interference may create
tort liability, on the basis of nuisance. Nuisance actions do not
involve claims of physical invasion of property rights. Instead,
landowners assert that excessive noise causes a compensable
harm resulting from interference with the landowner's use and
enjoyment of the property.212 Courts generally distinguish be-
tween public and private nuisances. A public nuisance is an un-
reasonable interference with a right common to the general
public, the public peace, or conduct proscribed by statute. 213 A
plaintiff must show that she suffered harm "of a kind different
from that suffered by. . . the general public.1214 Under a public
nuisance claim, public agencies may also sue on behalf of the
general public, for example, where private landowners encroach
207 See id. § 158 cmt. m.
208 See id. § 158 cmt. e. Cf id. § 192 (stating that an individual is privileged to
enter the portion of land on which there is a "public highway," so long as such an
entry is a reasonable use of the highway). A public highway can include "the air
space through which aircraft are privileged to travel." Id. at cmt. d. Reasonable
use of such a highway can depend on community usage and the public's needs,
legislative enactment, or judicial decision. See id. at cmt. e.
209 See id. § 159.
210 See id. at cmt. g (quoting Sir Edward Coke's maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum); see also supra note 163 and accompanying text discussing United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
211 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 159 cmt. k (1963-1964 Main Vol.).
212 See generally Stein, supra note 104 .
213 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1963-1964 Main Vol.).
214 Id. § 821C.
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on airport land or otherwise interfere with aerial approaches to
airports.21 5
A private nuisance, on the other hand, "is a nontrespassory
invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment
of land. '216 Private nuisance generally imposes liability only if
the affected landowners suffer "significant harm, of a kind that
would be suffered by a normal person in the community or by
property in normal condition and used for a normal pur-
pose. '21 7 Thus, the standard of care for determining the signifi-
cance of noise impacts is whether normal persons in the
community would regard the interference as intolerable, seri-
ously annoying, or definitely offensive. 218 Liability is not im-
posed if "normal persons" would consider the interference
merely annoying or disturbing, even if the plaintiff suffers
greater subjective harm. 2 " Greater damages may be available if
a plaintiff can demonstrate that the interference with her prop-
erty resulted from an "intentional interference" of her interest
in the use and enjoyment of her land.220 To prove private nui-
sance, landowners must generally demonstrate that the gravity
of the harm outweighs the utility of the tortfeasor's conduct,
and that the harm itself is serious enough to subject the
tortfeasor to potential liability if other landowners sue on similar
claims.22'
In assessing the gravity of harm, courts may look to several
factors, including: the extent of the harm involved; the charac-
ter of the harm involved; the social value attached to the af-
fected use or enjoyment; the suitability of the affected use and
enjoyment for the locality; and the burden on the injured per-
son of avoiding the harm.222 These factors must be weighed
against the utility of the conduct that allegedly causes the nui-
215 See id.
216 Id. § 821D.
217 Id. § 821F.
218 See id. § 821F cmt. d.
210 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 821F cmt. d (1963-1964 Main Vol.).
220 But cf. Bieneman v. City of Chicago, 864 F.2d 463, 468 (7th Cir. 1988) (not-
ing in dicta that plaintiff could not establish intent or recklessness in creating
noise pollution because noise was an unwelcome byproduct, not purposeful oper-
ation with the goal of creating noise. "[T]he proposition [that] to know of the
adverse consequences, and to do nothing to palliate things, is to "intend" that
consequence . . .fails.").
221 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1963-1964 Main Vol.).
222 See id. § 827.
486
2000] THE RIGHTS OF LANDOWNERS 487
sance. 22 2 1 Using this balancing test, courts will generally find that
a nuisance is unreasonable, and thus compensable, under lim-
ited circumstances: where the conduct offends common stan-
dards of decency;224 where the harm resulting from the invasion
is greater than the landowner should be required to bear with-
out compensation;2 25 where the tortfeasor can avoid causing the
injury without undue hardship;226 or where the tortfeasor's con-
duct is unsuitable for the locality.2 2
7
In Provident Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Atlanta, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
addressed the issue of whether property owners on contiguous
land could sue airports for public nuisance or trespass. 228 The
plaintiffs contended that the William B. Hartsfield Atlanta Inter-
national Airport represented a nuisance as a result of high levels
of noise, vibrations, and dust from over-flying planes. 229 The
court, however, stated that a "structure" constructed in accor-
dance with the law, and authorized to conduct public transpor-
tation, could not be considered a nuisance unless it was
improperly constructed or negligently operated, such that noise
or pollution exceeded what would occur from its proper opera-
tion.23 ° Consistent with the balancing test suggested in Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 826, the court appeared to conclude
that because the airport's activities were authorized by law, and
in the interests of the general public, the utility of the airport's
conduct outweighed any harm caused to the landowners. The
court determined that an entity that benefits the public could
not be enjoined from engaging in operations.23'
The court's decision in Provident Mutual also limits the ability
of individuals to sue airports for monetary damages on a nui-
sance theory, if the individuals are put on notice that noise is
likely to increase. Courts would more than likely conclude that
constructive notice has been given where construction has be-
gun on a new runway or where the airport has published an
ADP. Furthermore, even assuming that individuals do not re-
223 See id. § 828.
224 See id. § 829.
225 See id. § 829A.
226 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 830 (1963-1964 Main Vol.).
227 See id. § 831.
228 938 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
229 See id. at 831.
230 See id. at 832-33.
231 See id. at 835.
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ceive notice, the level of noise must exceed what would normally
be expected for airport operations for a nuisance theory to be a
viable cause of action.
For the same reasons, the court determined that the statute of
limitations precluded suit against the city because the increased
noise and pollution that caused the harm should have been ap-
parent to the plaintiff immediately after flights from the airport
began operating in 1987.32 The airport was a permanent facility
with traffic patterns that did not significantly change since the
occurrence of the original alleged injury to the plaintiffs prop-
erty in 1987.233 Consequently, the court also dismissed the
plaintiffs claim, stating that the plaintiffs right to sue "must be
exercised within four years of the creation or increase of the
nuisance if the harm is readily apparent. 234
Provident Mutual demonstrates that if the private nuisance is a
permanent nuisance, a landowner must file a claim before the
relevant statute of limitations has run. If the private nuisance is
a continuing nuisance, however, a landowner may be able to file
suit at any time during the duration of the nuisance. The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, in Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Air-
port Authorit2 35 addressed the issue of whether airport
operations were a permanent nuisance that barred the plain-
tiffs claim under the statute of limitations. In Baker, the plain-
tiffs filed an inverse condemnation suit against the airport
authority, alleging that noise impacts resulted in a nuisance.236
The trial court found that because the alleged nuisance was per-
manent, and the plaintiffs filed suit after the statute of limita-
tions had run on their claim, the plaintiffs were barred from
proceeding. 27 The California Supreme Court held, however,
that airport operations were the "quintessential continuing nui-
sance," and the statute of limitations did not apply.238 Such a
continuing nuisance would allow a landowner to sue for each
successive noise impact until the nuisance is abated. Damages,
232 The Court determined that the statute of limitations had already run for
both the nuisance and trespass causes of action. See id. at 834-36.
233 See id. at 835.
234 Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City of Atlanta, 938 F. Supp. 829, 836 (N.D.
Ga. 1995).
235 Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 39 Cal. 3d 862, 705
P.2d 866, 869 n.4, 218 Cal. Rptr. 293 (Cal. 1985).
236 See id. at 868-69.
237 See id. at 869.
238 Id. at 873.
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however, are limited to actual injury suffered prior to the com-
mencement of each action.239
The court also discounted the airport's argument that it had a
statutory privilege that protected it against nuisance suits. The
court stated that the "airport operator's separate duty to reduce
noise ... is particularly compelling in the present case. ' 240 The
court noted that the California statute explicitly required the
airport authority, as a proprietor, to make all reasonable efforts
to reduce airport noise pollution.2 41 ' Although flights to and
from the airport were generally privileged under the federal
preemption doctrine, the doctrine did not absolutely eliminate
local responsibility for airport noise control. 42 The airport op-
erator had an affirmative duty to minimize noise levels using
mitigating measures such as natural noise buffers and barri-
ers.24- Furthermore, state remedies through tort actions such as
nuisance remained available against an airport proprietor even
though federal law precludes direct regulation of airspace.244
Interestingly, local agencies have used the theory of nuisance
offensively in instances where property impedes an airport's
ability to function effectively. In County of Westchester v. Town of
Greenwich,245 the County of Westchester filed a claim against vari-
ous landowners, claiming that trees on their property consti-
tuted a public nuisance by blocking the airspace near an airport
runway, thus limiting its usable length.2 46 The County had to
show that the obstructive condition interfered with a right com-
mon to the general public. 24 7 The County also had to demon-
strate that: (1) the obstructive condition had a natural tendency
239 See id. at 870.
240 Id. at 872.
241 See Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 873,
(Cal. 1985).
242 See id. at 872 (citing the proprietor exception in City of Burbank v. Lock-
heed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973)). Cf DiPerri v. Federal Aviation Admin.,
671 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1982) (noting that the FAA could not be sued for conspiring
with Port Authority to create a noise nuisance because aircraft noise abatement
with respect to particular airports was primarily up to the local proprietor).
243 See Baker, 705 P.2d at 873.
244 See id. at 872; see also Greater Westchester Homeowner's Ass'n v. City of Los
Angeles, 603 P.2d 1329, 1335-36 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820 (1980) (hold-
ing that local government could impose liability on airport proprietor for prop-
erty damages stemming from nuisance even though federal law preempted local
police power).
245 County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 76 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1996).
246 See id. at 43.
247 See id. at 45.
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to create danger and inflict injury upon persons or property; (2)
the obstructive condition represented a continuing danger; (3)
the use of the land was unreasonable or unlawful; and (4) the
nuisance was the proximate cause of the injuries.248 Citing
Griggs v. Allegheny County,2 '1 the court noted that the county was
responsible for securing air easements necessary for airport op-
erations, including purchasing land around the airport.25" The
court also noted that the County, when it purchased the airport
from the federal government to convert it from military to civil-
ian use, acquired an airport "with an inherent potential for fu-
ture limits on flight operations. ' 25' The court held that the
airport operator had the burden to obtain the necessary land to
maintain its operations.252
IX. AN ECONOMICALLY BALANCED APPROACH TO
AIRPORT CAPACITY
A survey of the different legal theories behind suits against
airport operators reveals that the law does not consistently en-
force private property rights against airport operators and gov-
ernment agencies. The federal government has shown a clear
desire to preserve the economic success of the air transportation
system, and courts have generally resisted efforts by landowners
to get recovery for increased noise impacts. Neither the federal
government nor the courts have designed a bright-line balanc-
ing test that effectively protects the rights of property owners
while ensuring the overall efficiency of the air transportation sys-
tem. Under the current system, the essential issue remains
whether the rights and interests of property owners have been
adequately addressed in airport mitigation plans. Additionally,
regardless of whether novel legal theories are developed under
the current system, capacity problems will only intensify as air-
ports continue to expand in the future. Any current solutions
would not be sufficient to handle future growth.
The current legal framework has been unable to balance the
interests of airport development with the interests of property
owners for several reasons. 25 ' First, geographic areas have dif-
248 See id.
24)1 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); see also supra Part VII.
250 See Westchester, 76 F.3d at 45.
251 See id. at 46.
252 See id. at 47.
253 See Creswell, supra note 2, at 1 (recommending the development of a com-
prehensive system of planning with better allocation of federal, state, and local
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ferent local zoning laws that affect airport development in dif-
ferent ways. Federal law does not necessarily preempt such
inconsistent local laws, particularly when these laws fit within the
"proprietor exception," or are encouraged under a congres-
sional policy of multi-jurisdictional cooperation among federal
and state governments. Second, courts have been unwilling to
require airport developers to adopt less burdensome alterna-
tives to development plans, because federal and state laws man-
dating environmental impact studies require only limited due
process consideration. Third, courts differ in their willingness
to grant tort remedies to landowners that sue for damages stem-
ming from airport noise. Such noise impacts must produce
foreseeable and calculable injuries before courts are willing to
grant damages for government takings. Common law claims of
nuisance and trespass fail when landowners do not suffer noise
impacts beyond what would be foreseeable, reasonable, and
proper in airports. Landowners lose the right to sue for com-
pensation if they exceed a statute of limitations period. Courts
have split on whether to grant damages when a landowner
should have used reasonable diligence to identify potential
noise sources, or when a landowner acquiesces to changes in
airport operations.
An efficient solution must be both economically feasible and
sufficiently curative to ensure that property owners do not suffer
excessive economic loss and to ensure that the air transporta-
tion system can accommodate future growth. Rather than at-
tempting to balance artificially these equally important rights,
the federal government should focus on incentivizing economi-
cally efficient solutions that will ensure the continued growth of
air capacity while minimizing the impacts of noise on local com-
munities. In particular, the federal government should facilitate
three solutions to the airport capacity problem. First, the gov-
ernment should provide incentives for the development of "way-
ports" located in relatively less populated areas for the purpose
of hubbing connecting passengers. Second, the government
should provide incentives to state and local governments to con-
vert former military bases for civilian use. Finally, the govern-
ment should route all "pure" cargo traffic through smaller
regional hubs rather than through passenger airports.
resources and responsibilities to meet the long-term needs of the transportation
system).
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A policy of developing "reliever" airports to receive all traffic
that is "connecting-only" underlies all of these policy recommen-
dations. Connecting passengers do not have to be routed to air-
ports in high population density areas because the connections
are only temporary stops along the route to the final destina-
tion. The location of the stops is immaterial to the traveler. The
hub concept would be equally workable if an airport operates in
a remote area, because transporting large numbers of people
through a small number of points generates economic efficien-
cies. At the same time, the transportation system can retain cur-
rent airport capacity. The economic benefits to local
municipalities would be retained because airlines could con-
tinue to route disembarking passengers, who provide the great-
est amount of economic benefit, to destination airports. Cargo,
in particular, can be routed through less congested points until
it reaches its final destination. Cargo traffic, unlike passenger
traffic, does not have to be scheduled during peak times to max-
imize load factors. Cargo does not produce the economic effi-
ciencies generated by compressed scheduling. Existing facilities
and space that is currently used for cargo processing can be
more efficiently used for passenger deplanements.
Understandably, the cost of developing new facilities can be
prohibitive. Additionally, airlines would likely sustain short-
term losses as scheduling at high-capacity airports is spread out
across the new reliever airport network. Rather than accept
these losses, airports and airlines might be perfectly willing to
absorb the combined transactional costs of litigation, regulatory
fines, property declines, and loss of good will in exchange for
the status quo of expanding overburdened hubs. Wayports may
not have been a historically acceptable solution because the
costs of absorbing litigation are significantly less than building
an airport system designed solely for connecting passengers.
Clearly, in terms of economic development, businesses would
still want existing hubs. Indeed, the location of a major interna-
tional airport has been a major factor in many businesses' deci-
sions to move to a particular city. For example, large amounts
of money are spent on adding capacity to existing airports. For
instance, on December 15, 1999, the Dallas and Fort Worth City
Councils in Texas approved over $2 billion to expand Dallas/
Fort Worth International Airport.
Despite these drawbacks, wayports or "reliever" airports would
provide a number of social benefits, including:
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* Preserving the rights of local property owners in the value of
their land, and use and enjoyment of their property;
" Decreasing the demand pressure on the overburdened airport
system;
" Preserving local autonomy in land use planning and zoning;
" Minimizing noise impacts by decreasing flights in high density
population areas; and
* Ensuring future economic prosperity.
The use of remote cargo airports, reliever airports, or way-
ports would likely produce a mixed bag of economic benefits
and costs that should be balanced when assessing the feasibility
of new airport construction. The following non-exclusive list
suggests that in terms of overall economic impact, the benefits
of such construction might outweigh the costs.
Benefits Costs
Savings in construction costs and taxes Conversion of existing military air
through bond issues to airports and bases for civilian use, and other costs
local governments, of construction.
Decreased noise in larger hub Costs of acquiring sufficient land
communities. suitable for airport use, including
acquiring property interests and
securing necessary zoning approvals.
Potential for "S-curve" increases in Increased noise in remote
market share and revenue as a result communities in which the airports are
of increased capacity. constructed
Decreased litigation (either through Loss of hubbing efficiencies for airlines
lower number of lawsuits filed or by at large htbs.
increased likelihood of pre-trial
disposition.*
Preservation of existing economic Increased strains on the ATC.
development benefits by retaining hub
operations for disembarking
passengers.
Economic development opportunities Costs of building necessary freight




* Such "litigation" savings are likely to occur because existing military airfields
typically have acquired the necessary easements, and landowners near the military
bases already have notice of probable noise impacts. Additionally, less lawsuits would
be filed because the number of people potentially affected by noise in remote areas is
likely to be lower than the number of people living near airports in large urban
centers.
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Clearly, some of the benefits described above would take time
to produce any net gain. Before these gains could be realized,
short-term costs could be significant. For instance, conversion
of air bases would require significant resources, as would acquir-
ing the necessary land for airport development purposes. Some
cost factors can probably be excluded using a common sense
approach: for example, loss of economic development in larger
hub cities is unlikely when disembarking passengers form the
core of this economic development, and the proposed wayport
plan would continue to route disembarking passengers to ex-
isting airports. Any losses would likely stem from decreased
landing fees as air carriers transfer their operations to reliever
airports. Regional variations might also affect the extent of ben-
efits and costs. For example, the costs of converting certain mili-
tary air bases may be higher or lower depending on the existing
infrastructure such as runways, waste management, and road ac-
cess. Similarly, noise impacts on smaller communities may vary
depending on the population's location, size, and concentration
near the airport. These variations should be carefully weighed
to determine whether the benefits of constructing remote air-
ports truly outweigh the costs.
Austin-Bergstrom International Airport is an excellent exam-
ple of how a former military airbase can be converted to civilian
use.254 The City of Austin's former airport, Robert Mueller Mu-
nicipal Airport, reached the limits of available capacity and
caused noise impacts for nearly 20,000 people. Because the air-
port was landlocked on 711 acres in the middle of Austin, there
was no room for expansion. The city decided that the former
Bergstrom Air Force Base, decommissioned by the Base Realign-
ment and Closure Commission, provided an ideal location for
the development of a new airport. The site already had runways
and other facilities, and was located in a less populated area of
Austin eight miles from the city. The city budgeted $585 million
for the airport's construction, out of which one fourth of the
'254 See City of Austin, Austin-Bergstrom International Airport Project Summary,
(last visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/newairport/proj-
sumnr.htm>. Alliance Airport is another example of a reliever airport that has
generated significant economic development impact. Alliance Airport, north of
Fort Worth, operates as a purely industrial airport dedicated to cargo transporta-
tion and industrial park development. Alliance is in a remote location of Fort
Worth, with sufficient land to accommodate any necessary expansion. See Alli-
ance Airport, (last visited Feb. 5, 2000) <http://www.hillwood.com/prop/
aa.cfm>.
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cost was funded by the FAA. In May 1993 voters approved $400
million in revenue bonds to build Austin's new airport at Berg-
strom Air Force Base. In October 1993, the former military base
reverted to the City of Austin, and construction of a south access
road and airport rescue station commenced on March 6,
1995.255 Planners utilized an existing 12,250 foot runway and
added a second, shorter 9,000 foot runway parallel to the first,
allowing simultaneous landings and takeoffs. The city projected
that reusing the existing runway saved 75 percent of the cost of
building a new one. 25 16 Austin also planned the redevelopment
for the formerly operational Robert Mueller Municipal Airport.
An original version of the master plan recommended the crea-
tion of a mixed-use district, a state office urban campus com-
plex, and residential areas.257
Using Austin as a model, Congress should provide incentives
to private and public developers to build airports in remote ar-
eas or expand existing underutilized airfields.25 8 Congress has
already addressed the issue of constructing new hub airports in
the Airport and Airway Improvement Act.2 59 Under the Act, in
order for the Secretary of Transportation to approve an agency's
project grant application to construct a new hub airport, the
Secretary must submit a report to Congress analyzing the antici-
pated impact of a new hub on landing fees to be charged to air
carriers at the new facility, air transportation to be provided in
the geographic area of the new airport, and the availability and
cost of providing air transportation to rural areas in the re-
gion. 26" The statute expressly applies to new hub airports that
are expected to have at least 0.25 percent of total annual en-
planements in the United States. Although the statute provides
255 See City of Austin, Austin-Bergstrom International Airport Milestones, (last
visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/newairport/abiamil.htm>.
256 See City of Austin, Austin-Bergstrom International Airport Project Summary,
(last visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/newairport/
projsumnr.htm>.
257 See City of Austin, Redevelopment of Robert Mueller Municipal Airport,
(last visited Feb. 6, 2000) <http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/mueller/redevelop.htm>.
258 See generally Donald W. Tuegel, Note, Airport Expansions: The Need for a Greater
Federal Role, 54 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 291 (1998) (suggesting that the
federal government play a greater role in encouraging locally-derived solutions
that balance all competing interests); Christopher S. Marchese, The Dormant Com-
merce Clause and Airport Noise: A Case for NarrowJudicial Review, 44 BAYLOR L. REV.
645 (1992) (arguing that the Congress is better able to properly balance the
needs of different constituencies with respect to noise).
259 49 U.S.C. § 47106(e) (1999).
260 See id.
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some guidance in encouraging new airport construction, more
financial and regulatory incentives are required to encourage
government and private developers to build remote airports.
In addition to the construction of new facilities, other possible
solutions would help to ameliorate the effects of noise on com-
munities surrounding airports. Possible alternatives include:
Airport Master Planning to ensure a unified intergovernmental ap-
proach consistent with overall municipal development.
Such planning can stop problems before they start by allowing
all interested parties to participate in the decisioh-making pro-
cess. Additionally, effective planning can minimize incompati-
ble land uses, streamline the zoning process, and balance
environmental and economic concerns.
Creation of short haul routes in a point-to-point system coexisting with
the current hub and spoke system.
Assuming that reliever airports are too expensive to construct,
existing underutilized airports can easily be adapted to handle
short haul, point-to-point flights. Southwestern Airlines has
demonstrated the success of this strategy by flying point-to-point
routes out of Love Field in Dallas, Texas.
Airport acquisition of easements and other rights-of-way.
Airport authorities can avoid liability for nuisance or trespass
by acquiring easements over surrounding property. By compen-
sating landowners in exchange for property rights, future uncer-
tainties and litigation can be significantly reduced. The federal
government should encourage mitigation programs by provid-
ing tax incentives to private operators and transportation fund-
ing to public operators to compensate landowners in order to
avoid future problems.
More stringent environmental impact standards.
Noise impacts can be reduced if airports comply with more
demanding environmental standards. Stricter standards may
encourage more effective land use planning by forcing airports
to take surrounding property interests into account. In order to
avoid liability for failure to comply with environmental stan-
dards, airports may be more likely to structure their operations
to minimize such impacts.
Spreading the burden of mitigation to tenants of airport property, in-
cluding airlines.
One commentator has suggested that the current transporta-
tion system places too great a burden on local governments to
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mitigate noise.26' These local governments are not in the best
position to design an efficient system because of the importance
of airports' economic development impacts, and the tendency
to protect local revenues at the expense of other concerns. To
avoid this, liabilities from noise impacts should be distributed
among governments at all levels and private businesses such as
airlines, fixed base operators, and businesses located on airport
property. Fear of liability would incentivize all parties to design
effective solutions that would minimize these risks.
Mixed-use development related to transportation that would increase
the value of surrounding land despite the increase in noise.
Multi-modal transportation, free trade zones, industrial parks,
warehousing districts, and other novel solutions would maxi-
mize the value of property surrounding airports. Efforts should
be made to zone particular areas in ways that complement and
improve the value of airports. At the same time, property put to
the correct uses will maximize local, state, and national eco-
nomic gain while increasing the value of the property itself.
2 1 See Creswell, supra note 2, at 6.
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